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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that the Preah Vihear Temple territorial dispute is primarily a result of 
conflicting historical claims tied to the colonial legacy in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, 
the matter was not actually settled with the 1962 International Court of Justice decision 
and did not reemerge as a result of domestic politics in Thailand. Greater threats changed 
the behavior of both countries vis-à-vis the Preah Vihear Temple issue, creating the 
appearance that issue was actually settled. When those threats abated, the Preah Vihear 
issue resumed an important role in the relationship between Thailand and Cambodia. This 
thesis recognizes the importance of domestic political turmoil in Thailand arguing that it 
functioned as an accelerant on an already contentious issue.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Preah Vihear Temple is located near the border between the Kingdoms of 
Thailand and Cambodia. Since 1962, the temple legally belongs to Cambodia, but is 
currently the important element of a disagreement between the two countries. The 
territory immediately surrounding the temple is the subject of a border dispute between 
the governments of Thailand and Cambodia. Robert Mandel defines a border dispute as 
“…a violent or nonviolent conflict between two primary national antagonists over the 
demarcation of their shared boundary.”1  Given that much of Thailand and Cambodia’s 
798 kilometer border has not been properly demarcated, it begs the question: what is so 
important about this particular piece of territory?   
Following Cambodia’s independence from Colonial France in November of 1953, 
both Thailand and Cambodia claimed Preah Vihear.2  After bilateral negotiations failed 
to resolve the issue, Cambodia brought the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in 1959, winning ownership of the temple in the 1962 decision. Recently, the Preah 
Vihear Temple issue resurfaced, occupying a prominent role in the relationship between 
the two countries. From late 2008 until mid-2011, sporadic military skirmishes resulted in 
the deaths of both Thai and Cambodian military personnel. As a result of the dispute, the 
Cambodian government has taken the issue back to the ICJ. At issue is the conflicting 
interpretation of the 1962 decision. The Cambodian government argues that the original 
ruling covered the territory surrounding Preah Vihear. The Thai side argues that the 
ruling only covered the temple itself. The major research question of this thesis is:  What 
are the causes of the Preah Vihear Temple dispute? 
                                                 
1 Robert Mandel, "Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Dispute," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
24, no. 3 (Sep. 1980): 431. 
2 The Thai pronunciation “Pra Wihan” (พระวิหาร). 
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B. MAIN ARGUMENT 
This paper argues that the Preah Vihear Temple dispute is primarily a result of 
conflicting historical claims tied to the colonial legacy in Southeast Asia.  Moreover, it 
argues that the dispute was not actually settled with the 1962 decision. It appeared to be 
settled only because the issue was eclipsed by more serious threats to each country. 
Those greater threats changed the behavior of both countries vis-à-vis the Preah Vihear 
Temple issue. At times, the two countries were inclined to compromise at Preah Vihear. 
At other times, Thailand had an incentive to not pursue territorial claims while the 
government of Cambodia was incapable of exercising control over its national territory. 
This thesis does not dismiss the importance of the recent domestic political turmoil in 
Thailand. It argues however, that Thailand’s domestic political situation functioned as an 
accelerant on an already contentious issue that was never actually resolved. 
C. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis examines the importance of three different factors in the Preah Vihear 
Temple dispute over different time periods. The first is the matter of conflicting historical 
claims. Analysts of territorial disputes usually consider the historical dimensions 
important, and some argue that they can be a causal mechanism of their own. The second 
is the role of domestic politics. Most analysts argue that the current dispute is the result of 
domestic political issues in both countries, but Thailand primarily. Specifically, leaders 
and political factions exaggerate the issue to appeal to the nationalist sentiments of their 
populations and gain political support. The third is the effect of the “strategic 
environment.”  Countries do not interact independent of the external environment. This 
thesis examines the dispute in the context of other events affecting Thailand and 
Cambodia.    
The separate cases of this study are: the original dispute, the inter-dispute period, 
and the recent dispute. According to the current analysis on the Preah Vihear Temple 
issue, including scholarly sources and newspaper articles, the dispute was resolved in 
1962 and reemerged in 2008 due to Thailand’s domestic political problems. The dispute 
actually lingered for several years after the 1962 decision, and it also reemerged several 
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years prior to the 2008 escalation. As such, this paper follows a different timeline. The 
first case is the original dispute which began in 1953 and continued until 1966 when Thai 
and Cambodian military forces clashed at Preah Vihear. The second case is from 1968 
until the Khmer Rouge surrender 1998. The third case is from 1999 to the present.  
D. IMPORTANCE  
This issue is an important topic in the study of Thai-Cambodian relations. In the 
recent case, the disagreement escalated to a militarized dispute, resulting in the death and 
injury of both Thai and Cambodian soldiers. While the issue has subsided for the time 
being, analysts of Thailand-Cambodia relations have expressed concern that this dispute 
could escalate further.3  That concern is not without reason. Quantitative interstate 
conflict research demonstrates that territorial disputes are a leading cause of war. John 
Vasquez and Maria T. Henehan write, “[o]n the whole, territorial disputes also have a 
higher (conditional) probability of going to war than policy or regime disputes. They also 
account for the majority of wars.”4  Large sections of the border have yet to be 
demarcated, and Thai and Cambodian troops have skirmished at other temples in 
disputed territory. Additionally, while military losses from 2008 to 2011 were limited, the 
dispute has disrupted the lives of a significant number of Thai and Cambodian 
noncombatants living in the border region.  
The dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple and 
surrounding territory also has implications for regional stability and the legitimacy of 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) ASEAN. Both countries are members of the 
organization.5  In 2009, Amitav Acharya wrote that the Preah Vihear Temple dispute is 
“perhaps the most serious threat to ASEAN’s inter-mural peace.”6  ASEAN did not exist 
                                                 
3  Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Temple of Doom: Hysteria About the Preah Vihear Temple in the Thai 
Nationalist Discourse,” in Legitimacy Crisis in Thailand: ed. Mark Askew (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 
2010), 113.  
4 John Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan, "Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816–1992," 
Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2 (Mar. 2001): 123. 
5 ASEAN website, “ASEAN Member States,” http://www.asean.org/18619.htm. 
6 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order, 2nd ed. (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2009), 155.  
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when the original dispute occurred. Now that bilateral negotiations have again proved 
ineffective, the current dispute represents an opportunity for the organization to help 
resolve the issue.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In much of the contemporary literature, the Preah Vihear Temple dispute is 
included in the analysis of other issues such as domestic and regional politics. 
Additionally, most of the analysis is focused on the military clashes that occurred in 2008 
and 2009. The analysts of both domestic and regional politics place most of the blame on 
the domestic political environment in each country. Specifically, in Thailand, political 
factions use the Preah Vihear issue to delegitimize their political opponents and gather 
support. In Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen uses the issue to further consolidate his 
leadership. While there are inputs from both countries causing the Preah Vihear conflict, 
most of the analysis places more blame on the Thai side.   
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, who has written a recent account of the dispute, writes 
that the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), composed of “a coalition of royalists, 
Bangkok elites, factions in the military and powerful business interests” seized on the 
Preah Vihear issue, for domestic political gain.7  James Ockey presents a similar 
argument. He writes that Thai and Cambodian governments had come to an accord 
regarding the Preah Vihear Temple and that the disagreement did not begin until the 
People’s PAD made it into a political issue. It was not, “…an irritant in Thai-Cambodian 
relations, until the PAD decided to take up the issue to gain nationalist support for its 
cause.”8  Another analyst of Thai politics, Kitti Prasirtsuk also writes, “…the dispute 
over the Preah Vihear Temple has reemerged, this time very much linked to domestic 
politics in both Thailand and Cambodia.”9   
                                                 
7  Chachavalpongpun, "Temple of Doom: Hysteria About the Preah Vihear Temple in the Thai 
Nationalist Discourse," 83. 
8 Ockey, James. "Thailand in 2008: Democracy and Street Politics." Southeast Asian Affairs 2009 
(2010), 320. 
9 Kitti Prasirtsuk, “Thailand in 2008: Crisis Continued,.” Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 1, (2009), 183. 
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On the Cambodian side, the Preah Vihear Temple dispute is also included in the 
analysis of domestic politics. Authors argue that Cambodian Prime Mister Hun Sen uses 
the dispute to appeal to the nationalism of the Cambodian people. According to Carlyle 
Thayer, the explanation for Cambodia’s behavior is the fact that the United Nations 
Education, Scientific, and Cultural, Organization (UNESCO) listing and ensuing fallout 
occurred in an election year. While Hun Sen manipulated and benefited from the issue, he 
was in part compelled to respond to the Thai deployment of troops by sending 
Cambodian military forces to Preah Vihear.10 Caroline Hughes presents a similar 
argument and adds that the military elite of Cambodia benefit from the controversy as 
they can claim more territory for their forces and lobby for a larger share of Cambodia’s 
budget.11    
Analysts who discuss the Preah Vihear Temple issue, as it relates to regional or 
inter-ASEAN politics, also credit domestic political problems as the cause. Amitav 
Acharya discusses the portion of the territory surrounding Preah Vihear that is still in 
dispute. He writes that factions within Thailand used the issue to attack the Samak 
administration while Cambodia leader Hun Sen provoked nationalism for his own gain.12  
Donald Weatherbee and Catharine Dalpino present similar arguments.13  
While the Preah Vihear Temple issue is linked to the domestic politics in each 
country, this thesis evaluates the role of domestic politics at different points in the 
dispute. It examines the domestic political situations in each country when Preah Vihear 
was a subject of dispute in the 1950s and 1960s and most recently. Additionally, this 
thesis briefly surveys periods of time when domestic political turmoil did not lead to 
conflict or dispute over Preah Vihear. 
                                                 
10 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Cambodia: The Cambodian People's Party Consolidates Power," Southeast 
Asian Affairs 2009 (2010): 92. 
11 Caroline Hughes, "Cambodia in 2008: Consolidation in the Midst of Crisis," Asian Survey 49, no. 1, 
(Jan/Feb 2009): 212. 
12 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order, 185. 
13 Donald E. Weatherbee,. International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy. Asia 
in World Politics; Variation: Asia in World Politics. 2nd ed. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2009; Catharin Dalpino, "Southeast Asia in 2008: Challenges within and without," Southeast 
Asian Affairs 2009 (2010): 10. 
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History is an important theme in the territorial dispute literature. Andrew 
Burghardt argues that history comprises the emotional aspect. He observes, “[n]ations 
have a distressing tendency to remember in detail all the grandeurs of the 
past…[and]…“[p]roblems arise when claims clash.”14  Adam Murphy argues that 
historical reasons have become the primary justification for territorial struggles in many 
places throughout the world writing, “[t]erritorial disputes unfold amidst a discourse of 
justification based on ambiguities in the historical record.”15  These concepts seem 
readily applicable to the Preah Vihear Temple dispute.   
Most analysts of the current dispute make brief mention of the historical 
dimensions. Some include a description of the circumstances surrounding the 1962 ICJ 
decision but do not explain what lead to the dispute in the first place. Kitti Prasirtsuk 
writes that “Thailand and Cambodia had bitterly disputed rights to the temple in the 
1950s...”16  He concludes that Thailand grudgingly accepted the decision. James Ockey 
also describes the early dispute as bitter and argues that many Thais did not accept the 
decision. Chachavalpongpun’s work is an exception in that he provides more detail on the 
historical roots of the dispute. He writes, “…the temple is located in disputed territory, 
sitting on top of colonial landmines that have been waiting to explode.”17  This thesis 
seeks to build on the historical details provided in his account.  
Prior to the arrival of colonial France, Thailand and Vietnam vied for control over 
the territory that is now Cambodia. When colonial France established colonies adjacent to 
Thailand, it claimed territory that was within the Thai sphere of influence. Many in 
Thailand consider several Cambodian provinces Thailand’s “lost” territory.18  Tongchai 
Winichakul and Shane Strate maintain that the theme of loss is important to the identity 
                                                 
14 Andrew F. Burghardt, "The Bases of Territorial Claims," Geographical Review 63, no. 2 (Apr. 
1973): 232. 
15 Alexander B. Murphy, "Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims," Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers 80, no. 4 (Dec. 1990): 537. 
16 Prasirtsuk, Thailand in 2008: Crises Continued, 177. 
17  Chachavalpongpun, "Temple of Doom: Hysteria About the Preah Vihear Temple in the Thai 
Nationalist Discourse,” 85. 
18 David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 
2003), 193. 
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of the Thai people. Strate argues that the theme of loss was a central narrative when the 
nationalist Phibun Songkram government attacked Colonial France’s holdings in 
Indochina (now Cambodia) during World War II. In the minds of the Thai leadership, 
they were reclaiming the lost territories.  
After World War II, the Thai government was forced to surrender the once lost 
but regained territories back to Colonial France. Those territories were “lost” once again, 
an experience that was quite traumatic for the leaders of Thailand.19  After Cambodia 
gained independence from France in 1953, the Thai leaders believed that Preah Vihear 
belonged to Thailand. When Thailand lost the world court decision, the wound of “loss” 
was reopened. According to Chachavalpongpun, the loss of Preah Vihear to Cambodia 
was particularly painful because it was a loss to a weaker nation that used to be its 
protectorate.20   
This history of the matter helps explain why the dispute was so acrimonious and 
why many in Thailand had such a hard time accepting the decision. L.P. Singh, shortly 
after the ICJ decision, writes that the verdict sparked outrage in Thailand.21  Shane Strate, 
who describes the widespread anger in Thailand, writes that the Thai Generals threatened 
to fight to the death over Preah Vihear.22  While the Thai government did not go to war 
over the temple, ample evidence exists to demonstrate that it did not accept the decision 
in good faith. The opinion in Cambodia, however, was different. According to Alexander 
Hinton,  the Cambodian people believed the Preah Vihear Temple and surrounding 
territory rightfully belonged to Cambodia. The ICJ decision represented a great victory 
over a neighbor that has historically mistreated and dominated them.23 The history also 
relates to another theme, which is the importance of Cambodia’s archeological heritage.   
                                                 
19 Shane Strate, “The Lost Territories: The Role of Trauma and Humiliation in the Formation of 
National Consciousness in Thailand” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin Madison, 2009). 
20  Chachavalpongpun, Temple of Doom, 87. 
21 L. P. Singh, "The Thai-Cambodian Temple Dispute," Asian Survey 2, no. 8 (Oct. 1962): 25. 
22  Strate, The Lost Territories: The Role of Trauma and Humiliation in the Formation of National 
Consciousness in Thailand, 237–238. 
23 Alexander Hinton, "Khmerness and the Thai 'Other': Violence, Discourse and Symbolism in the 
2003 Anti-Thai Riots in Cambodia," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 37, no. 3 (Oct 2006): 445. 
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According to Hinton, when France replaced Thailand (and Vietnam) as the 
dominant power in Cambodia, the colonial administrators sought to cultivate a sense of 
Cambodian national identity. To do so, they preserved and promoted Cambodia’s ancient 
temples, most notably Angkor Wat.24  Cambodia’s ancient temples became an important 
part of Cambodia’s national character and culture. According to Caroline Hughes, 
exploitation of Cambodia’s archaeological heritage is a common tactic of the ruling 
party.25  David Chandler also links nationalism in Cambodia to archaeological heritage. 
In his analysis, the current Preah Vihear Temple dispute is a resurfacing of the tension 
associated with the 2003 anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh.26  The riots occurred when the 
Cambodian press erroneously reported that a popular Thai actress claimed that Angkor 
Wat (Cambodia’s national symbol) should belong to Thailand.  
On both the Thai and Cambodian sides, the Preah Vihear Temple issue seems to 
evoke an emotional response. Some in Thailand react emotionally to the threat of losing 
territory. Some in Cambodia react emotionally to threats to their national heritage. It is 
possible that this factor is independent of the particular domestic political situation in 
each country and salient enough to cause conflict.  However, the history is constant and 
the dispute is not.  
As with any international relationship, Thailand and Cambodia relations do not 
exist in a vacuum. In a quantitative analysis of territorial disputes, Paul Huth found that 
“the international strategic environment…” is an important factor in the disputing 
countries’ behavior.27 Caroline Hughes touches on a similar idea in her work on 
Cambodian domestic politics. She writes of the temple dispute, “[f]or decades the issue 
was largely moot, since the area was cut off by warfare, landmines, and destruction of  
 
                                                 
24  Hinton, Khmerness and the Thai 'Other': Violence, Discourse and Symbolism in the 2003 Anti-
Thai Riots in Cambodia," 446.  
25 Caroline Hughes, "Cambodia in 2008: Consolidation in the Midst of Crisis," Asian Survey 49, no. 1 
(Jan/Feb 2009): 206. 
26 David Chandler, "Cambodia in 2009: Plus C'Est La Même Chose," Asian Survey 50, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 
2010): 233. 
27 Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1996), 184.  
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infrastructure; but since 2003, it has been accessible again, raising once more the issue of 
ownership.”28  Her analysis indicates that the strategic environment prevented conflict 
over Preah Vihear.  
The Thai government was concerned with the advance of communism in the 
countries they shared borders with, as well as in their own country, from the mid-1960s 
through the late 1970s. David Wyatt writes that “the situation in Indochina looked 
increasingly threatening to Thailand and the United States,” as the war in Vietnam was 
spreading to Laos and Cambodia.29  He adds that later, Thailand was facing a domestic 
communist insurgency that corresponded with the (United States) U.S. departure from the 
region and was a “major security crisis” for Thailand.30   
Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were all taken over by communist forces in 
1975. In 1978, a unified Vietnam invaded Cambodia and overthrew the Khmer Rouge, 
establishing a puppet government.31  According to Sukhumbhand Paribatra, the majority 
of Thais considered Vietnam’s presence in Cambodia a threat to Thailand’s security.32  
According to Leszek Busyneski, until the termination of the Cambodian conflict in the 
late 1980s, security dominated Thailand’s foreign policy.33  In the strategic environment 
of the inter-dispute period, both countries had other security concerns.  
Even after the end of the cold war and the resolution of the Vietnamese 
occupation of Cambodia, the Cambodian government was not able to exercise effective 
control of their territory. Alexander Hinton writes that the Khmer Rouge guerillas held 
                                                 
28 Caroline Hughes, "Cambodia in 2009: The Party's Not Over Yet," Southeast Asian Affairs 2010 
(2011): 95. 
29 David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 
2003), 278. 
30 Ibid., 280.  
31 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem 
of Regional Order, 2nd ed. (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2009), 104.  
32 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Strategic Implications of the Indochina Conflict: Thai Perspectives," 
Asian Affairs 11, no. 3 (Fall 1984): 33–34. 
33 Leszek Buszynski, "Thailand's Foreign Policy: Management of a Regional Vision," Asian Survey 
34, no. 8 (Aug. 1994): 721. 
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the temple from 1993 until 1998.34  The government of Cambodia did not assume control 
of the temple until the Khmer Rouge surrendered in 1998. Thus, the government of 





                                                 
34 Hinton, Khmerness and the Thai 'Other': Violence, Discourse and Symbolism in the 2003 Anti-Thai 
Riots in Cambodia," 460. 
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II. ORIGINAL DISPUTE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter argues that the original Preah Vihear Temple dispute was a result of 
a combination of conflicting historical claims and the strategic environment. The first 
section outlines the history of Thailand and Cambodia as it relates to the Preah Vihear 
Temple issue and concludes that conflicting historical claims were a very important 
element but not sufficient on their own to explain the dispute. The second section 
discusses the domestic political situation within each country. It argues that though Preah 
Vihear was an important domestic political issue, the dispute was a result of legitimate 
foreign policy concerns among leaders in each country. The third section argues that the 
strategic environment was responsible for the escalation of the dispute, but was also 
responsible, in large part, for the ostensible resolution. The final section is a summary of 
the first three sections and concludes that the dispute was not actually resolved with the 
1962 ICJ decision. 
B. HISTORICAL FACTORS 
Underlying the Preah Vihear dispute and Thai-Cambodian relations in general is 
the fact that Thais and Cambodians can each make a plausible claim to much of the same 
territory. A map proudly displayed outside the Cambodian tourist center in Phnom Penh 
during the early 1960s showed that the Khmer Empire at its peak (1,000 years prior) was 
comprised of much of mainland Southeast Asia, including Thailand.35  Thai maps widely 
circulated during the Phibun Songkram nationalist era, and influential ever since, depict 
much of Cambodia as Thai territorial “losses” during the colonial era.36  The Preah 
Vihear Temple dispute can be seen in this context, but there is a more acute and direct 
cause. Specifically, Preah Vihear sits on the Thai-Cambodian border that was 
                                                 
35 M. L. Manich Jumsai, History of Thailand & Cambodia, from the Days of Angkor to the Present 
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ambiguously demarcated by colonial era treaties. Consequently, both countries had 
reasonable claims to the temple. As noted in the introduction, “problems arise when 
claims clash.”   
By the mid-19th century the Khmer empire had almost disappeared, most of its 
former territory incorporated by Cambodia’s neighbors, Siam (present day Thailand) and 
Vietnam. It was on the verge of being completely subsumed when France established its 
colony in Indochina (present day Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). This preserved 
Cambodia as a separate entity, which would allow it to become a free and independent 
country in the future.37  In preserving Cambodia, France necessarily limited Siamese 
expansion.38  Different versions of maps published in Thailand show Thailand’s “lost” 
territories. Thailand’s “losses,” in what is now Cambodia, began with the establishment 
of the French protectorate in 1863.39   
The borders of Thailand and the French colony developed over the next several 
decades. Thailand and colonial France signed multiple treaties from 1863 until 1907. 
Most of them occurred under circumstances that Siam’s leaders, at the time, would have 
considered less than fair. In 1867, France recognized Battambang and Siem Reap 
(location of Angkor Wat) as part of Siam.40  In 1893, French and Siamese forces clashed 
in what is modern day Laos. The conflict culminated with a French naval blockade of 
Bangkok. In the treaty that followed, Siam renounced all territory east of the Mekong 
River.41 
The original dispute over Preah Vihear can be traced to the 1904 and 1907 
Franco-Siam treaties that established the border between northern and eastern Siam, and 
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French-controlled Cambodia.42  The treaty provided for the watershed in the Dangrek 
Mountains as the boundary between Thai and French colonial territory. French officers 
were responsible for surveying the area.43  Preah Vihear stood on the Thai side of the 
watershed. It resides on a cliff that is Thai territory, according to the text of the treaty, 
overlooking the plain below which is Cambodian territory. However, the French 
surveyors departed from the natural topography and placed Preah Vihear in Cambodian 
territory on the map that they produced, arbitrarily it seems.44  In 1975, local legend held 
that the cartographer who produced the map was under the influence of champagne and 
distracted by local girls when he created it.  As a result, his pencil slipped, accidentally 
placing the temple in Cambodian territory on the map. 45 In any case, Siamese officials 
did not actually learn of the discrepancy between the treaty language and French map 
until they conducted their own survey of the area in 1934.46  This discrepancy was the 
most direct historical cause of the Preah Vihear Temple dispute. 
The outbreak of World War II resulted in a temporary shift in the border between 
Thailand and the French Colonial administration. Thai leader Phibun Songkram changed 
the name of Siam to “Thailand” in 1939 and France signed a nonaggression pact in 1940; 
the French also agreed to “return” some of Thailand’s claimed territory.47  However, 
France fell to Germany and the new Vichy government did not honor the agreement. The 
Thai government decided to take the territory by force. Thailand and the French colonial 
authority in Cambodia went to war in 1940 until early 1941.48  To resolve the conflict, 
Imperial Japan compelled France to seek a settlement that included the transfer of much 
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of western Cambodia to Thai control.49  The peace treaty that France and Thailand signed 
in March of 1941 returned the Cambodian provinces to Thailand, with the exception of 
Angkor Wat, which remained in Cambodian control.50   
At the conclusion of WWII, the French moved to reclaim its colonial territories. 
The contested Cambodian provinces were still important to the Thai elites and they did 
not want to relinquish them.51  Unfortunately (for the Thai government), the French 
government held a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and leveraged 
its position to reclaim its colonial holdings.52   The treaty of Washington in 1946 returned 
the border to its prewar status.53  This was devastating to the leaders and people of 
Thailand. They were left with little choice, however, given the circumstances of 
Thailand’s alignment with Imperial Japan and France’s alignment with the allied powers.   
The return to the prewar status placed Preah Vihear back in French territory, but it 
would soon become an issue. The Thai government sent caretakers to the temple as early 
as 1949, ignoring French requests to vacate it.54  The temple was evidently not very 
important to the French colonial authorities who were trying to maintain control over 
Indochina, fighting against the nationalist Vietminh. When Cambodia achieved 
independence from France on November 9, 1953, its leader Norodom Sihanouk pursued 
the issue.55  In February 1954, the Cambodian government began to send correspondence 
to the Thai government regarding the presence of Thai nationals occupying the temple.56  
The issue remained unresolved but seemed unimportant. Shortly thereafter, the dispute 
erupted. 
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Though the Thai government had effective control of Preah Vihear as early as 
1949, it seemed to formally assert sovereignty over the temple in 1956. After building a 
border police station at the site of the temple, officials raised the Thai flag at the Preah 
Vihear Temple.57  This is when Sihanouk formally protested and began to pursue the 
issue. Leaders in Thailand cited the fact that the temple fell on the Thai side of the 
watershed, according to the language of the 1904 treaty. Leaders in Cambodia argued that 
because the maps associated with the treaty placed the temple in Cambodia, it belonged 
to the Cambodian government.58  The two countries engaged in bilateral negotiations 
until 1958, making no headway. In 1959 Cambodia broke diplomatic relations and took 
the issue to the ICJ.59  In 1962, the court ruled that the temple belonged to Cambodia.60  
The court based its ruling, in large part, on the maps produced by French colonial 
authorities in 1907 that depicted Preah Vihear in Cambodian territory.  Because the Thai 
government did not challenge the accuracy of the maps when it received them in 1908 or 
at any point later, the court found that the Thai government had implicitly accepted 
them.61  Additionally, it ruled that French officials had practiced various acts of 
sovereignty over the years that were not challenged by the Thai government; moreover, 
the Thai government had not practiced acts of sovereignty during the same period. The 
watershed issue was actually ruled irrelevant. 
The original dispute was a result of the conflicting historical claims captured in 
treaty documents from five decades prior. Each side had documents supporting its claim 
to the temple. The two claims were irreconcilable. However, the discrepancy existed for 
several years before actually erupting into a diplomatic crisis between Thailand and 
Cambodia. What triggered the dispute was the Thai government’s buildup at the border  
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leading to what appeared to be a formal claim on the temple. This will be addressed in 
more detail during the strategic environment section. The next section will discuss the 
role domestic politics played in the original Preah Vihear dispute. 
C. DOMESTIC POLITICAL FACTORS 
1. Thailand 
Thailand was dealing with power struggles at the elite level during the time 
leading up to the Preah Vihear Temple dispute. Prime Minister Phibun Songkram fended 
off two coup attempts by former leader Pridi Banomyong. The second attempt, in 1951, 
resulted in intense fighting between the Navy on one side, and the Army, Police and 
eventually the Air Force on the other. Royal Thai Navy (RTN) sailors apprehended 
Phibun and held him captive onboard a combatant vessel. After the fighting broke out, 
the Thai Air Force intervened and sank three Navy ships, including the one Phibun was 
held on. He escaped by swimming to shore.62  Phibun was driven into exile by Field 
Marshall Sarit Thanarat in 1957. Sarit used the issue of U.S. influence in Thailand to rally 
nationalist support prior to his coup d’état against Phibun.63  While Sarit was in charge, 
he appointed two acting Prime Ministers before taking formal control in 1958 and ruling 
as a military dictator. He would lead Thailand until his death in 1963. Sarit believed in 
“benevolent despotism” but was also cognizant of “the need of [sic] popular support.”64   
It would seem that amidst these power struggles, the Preah Vihear Temple could 
have been used by rival politicians to rally domestic support. This does not appear to 
have been the case. At the elite level, as well as among the Thai population, there seemed 
to be unanimity that the Thai government should pursue Thailand’s claims to the Preah 
Vihear Temple. Thailand was essentially a unitary actor in this case. One Thai Member 
of Parliament was an exception. He suggested just handing Preah Vihear over in the 
interest of international relations and trade. This politician was widely denounced and 
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Thai newspapers accused him of “…wanting to sell out his country.”65   His was a rare 
view and did not represent any kind of power struggle.  
Observers of Thai politics argue that nationalism and defense of territorial 
integrity are strongest at the elite level. Lennox Mills writes, “[n]ationalism pervades 
every stratum of society, although it is strongest in the ruling class.”66  Of Thai foreign 
policy in general, Panitan Wattanayagorn writes: “[f]or the Thai elite, maintaining 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity is considered the central security 
objective.” 67  In this light, the Preah Vihear Temple dispute reflected the legitimate 
foreign policy concerns of leaders in Thailand.  
The political elite were not the only force acting in the dispute. The Thai 
population and media organizations pressured Thai leaders to act. For example, when the 
Cambodian government brought the case before the ICJ, there was public outcry in 
Thailand. Grass roots campaigners called for donations to aid Thailand’s legal case. The 
Thai government set up a special committee to handle the donations, but this was in 
reaction to something the population came up with on its own.68   
When the ICJ released its judgment on Preah Vihear, it sparked outrage at all 
levels in Thailand. Thai leaders decried the decision while students demonstrated 
throughout the country. Thamasaat University withdrew Norodom Sihanouk’s honorary 




                                                 
65 Strate, The Lost Territories: The Role of Trauma and Humiliation in the Formation of National 
Consciousness in Thailand, 227–228. 
66 Mills, Southeast Asia; Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics, 104. 
67 Panitan Wattanayagorn, “Thailand: The Elite's Shifting Conceptions of Security,” in Asian Security 
Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998), 422–423. 
68 Strate, The Lost Territories: The Role of Trauma and Humiliation in the Formation of National 
Consciousness in Thailand, 229–232. 
69 L. P. Singh, "The Thai-Cambodian Temple Dispute," Asian Survey 2, no. 8 (Oct. 1962): 25. 
 18
Thailand would abide by the court ruling.70  While his decision was contrary to the 
wishes of the Thai people, no rival political entities emerged to make an issue of the way 
he handled it. 
Exploitation of the issue in Thailand by political leaders does not appear to be 
responsible for Thailand’s behavior. The issue was important at all levels of Thai society, 
but there is no indication that political leaders used it to rally political support against 
another faction, despite the fact that at least one leader had used other foreign policy 
issues for domestic political gain. This was most likely because there was no real 
difference in opinion on how the issue should be handled. There was virtual unanimity on 
the righteousness of Thailand’s case.  
2. Cambodia 
Cambodia entered the Preah Vihear Temple dispute from a different place in the 
international system. It did not achieve independence until 1953. However, within two 
years, Norodom Sihanouk, the leader of Cambodia, had consolidated his leadership by 
neutralizing his political opposition and fending off coup d’état attempts. David Chandler 
writes, “[c]ompared with what came later and what had gone before, the years 1955–
1965 constituted a kind of golden age.”71  As was the case with Thailand, the Preah 
Vihear issue was an important domestic political issue and a legitimate foreign policy 
issue.  
Though Sihanouk had successfully consolidated his leadership and did not face 
any credible internal challengers, the Preah Vihear issue did present Sihanouk with a 
domestic political opportunity. He prized consensus and according to David Chandler, 
“…treated election campaigns as ways of obtaining 100 percent approval.”72  The Preah 
Vihear Temple dispute occurred soon after Sihanouk’s abdication as King of Cambodia 
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and his entrance into Cambodian politics as a quasi-private citizen. 73   According to one 
historian, during the dispute, “[i]n March 1958, thousands of students, policemen, and 
civil servants marched past the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh to protest a perceived lack 
of respect from Thailand.”74  It made sense for Sihanouk to take a hard-line stance on 
Preah Vihear, given his desire for 100 percent approval and how the issue seemed to 
resonate with so many Cambodians.  
Arguably, Sihanouk did have some personal political interest in pursuing the 
issue. He could use the Preah Vihear Temple dispute to distance himself from his former 
colonial patrons.75  He had been placed on the Cambodian throne by French officials 
after his father died in 1941.76  He was, thus, closely identified with the French 
authorities in Cambodia. After gaining independence from France in 1953, the Preah 
Vihear Temple dispute represented an opportunity for Sihanouk to deflect attention from 
his former benefactors and shift Cambodian nationalism toward its historical adversary, 
the aggressive and expansionist Thailand.77  While Sihanouk did have some domestic 
political incentive to pursue the Preah Vihear Temple case, he had legitimate foreign 
policy concerns as well. 
Noting Cambodia’s precarious position in Southeast Asia, one analyst argues that 
Sihanouk’s foreign policy decisions at the time had much to do with legitimate threats to 
Cambodia’s sovereignty. He wanted “…to preserve the existence of Cambodia as an 
identifiable, and hopefully, independent, national entity.”78  Cambodia had to work hard 
to achieve independence from France. It was completely rational that Sihanouk would 
seek to protect Cambodian sovereignty. Cambodia faced challenges from Thailand, and 
North and South Vietnam.  After all, the government of Thailand had taken provinces in 
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western Cambodia, by force, only two decades earlier in what was a traumatic issue for 
Sihanouk’s father. Sihanouk’s rhetoric during the crisis included talk of Thailand’s 
intentions to annex portions of Cambodia.79  It was not unreasonable to consider Thai 
threats to Cambodia’s sovereignty bearing in mind how recently the Thais occupied 
Cambodia and how reluctantly they relinquished control.  
After his decision to confront the Thai government over Preah Vihear, it made 
sense for Sihanouk to take the case to the ICJ. This choice provided Cambodia the 
opportunity to engage Thailand in a more favorable setting, as Cambodia was the weaker 
country. Though the reaction in Thailand to the “internationalization” of the dispute was 
negative, this was somewhat hypocritical. The Thai government chose a similar strategy 
in the wake of World War II. It tried (unsuccessfully) to petition the United Nations to 
adjudicate its dispute with France regarding the “lost” territories. 80  Sihanouk was merely 
using the same tactic, which was to appeal to the United Nations (UN) and international 
community due to the fact that Cambodia could not resolve the issue on its own.  
While Sihanouk may have had some incentive to pursue the Preah Vihear Temple 
case, it was a legitimate foreign policy issue for Cambodia. The Thai government 
claimed Preah Vihear, and had Sihanouk not contested it in the manner he did, Cambodia 
would likely not have been able to reclaim it. Of course, it did not have to be a zero-sum 
issue; it is possible that the two countries could have shared management of the temple. 
However, the strategic environment made that unlikely. 
D. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
The behavior of the Thai and Cambodian governments had much do to with their 
alignment as the Cold War developed.  Specifically, the two countries were drawn into 
separate blocs. It may be more accurate to say that the two countries were simply not in 
the same camp. Due to its fear of the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, and the 
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Thai government’s fear of communism, Thailand aligned with the Western anti-
communist powers led by the United States. Cambodia, fearful of losing its sovereignty, 
walked a tightrope between the powers active in Southeast Asia. It adopted a policy of 
neutrality but maintained relationships with communist countries, including the PRC. 
This would have implications for the Preah Vihear Temple dispute.  
The Cold War relationship between the U.S. and Thailand began in the wake of 
World War II. France and the United Kingdom moved to retake their respective colonial 
territories as well as impose other penalties upon Thailand for its alliance with Imperial 
Japan. The U.S. took a more conciliatory approach, working on Thailand’s behalf. 
According to David Wyatt, “…the U.S. State Department consistently was an advocate 
for Thailand against the British.”81  While close to the U.S., Thai leader Pridi Banomyong 
was also aligned with the various freedom movements in Southeast Asia that placed him 
at odds with U.S. allies. The Thai government initially supported the anti-colonial 
freedom forces throughout Southeast Asia, including those in Vietnam and Cambodia. In 
Vietnam’s fight for independence from France, the Thai government was a supporter of 
Ho Chi Minh’s Vietminh forces.82  However, when Phibun Sonkgram returned to power 
in the late 1940s as an anti-communist, he moved Thailand decisively into the Western 
camp.83  As an indication of the relationship between Thailand and the U.S., Phibun’s 
government contributed 4,000 troops to the fight on the Korean Peninsula.84  
Cambodia achieved independence from France in 1953. The process began after 
WWII and occurred peacefully, for the most part. However, French troops remained in 
Cambodia until 1954 to combat communist forces that were receiving assistance from the 
Vietnamese.85  After Cambodia gained independence, the Thai government, under  
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Phibun, immediately established diplomatic relations.86  In spite of starting off on the 
right foot, the relationship took a turn for the worse quickly thereafter. Up until this point, 
Preah Vihear had not emerged as a significant issue.  
The Thai and Cambodian governments responded to the changing strategic 
environment in different ways. The Thai government embraced the Western anti-
communist block, whereas the Cambodian government rejected it. In 1954, Thailand 
became a founding member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) when it 
was formed after the defeat of the French by the Vietminh as Dien Bien Phu.87  
Cambodia, on the other hand, opted for neutrality, rejecting SEATO. Sihanouk had 
various reasons for this. The Geneva Agreement of 1954 ended the first Indochina war, 
provided for the division of Vietnam into North and South Vietnam and also called for 
the departure of all Vietminh forces from Cambodia.88   Sihanouk, however, had no way 
to actually remove them from his country.  He saw the proposition of joining SEATO as 
a provocation to the communist powers in Asia.89  He thus refused to join it. This placed 
Thailand and Cambodia in separate blocs and would have an important effect on the 
Preah Vihear Temple issue. 
The Thai government’s response to Sihanouk’s rejection of SEATO appears to be 
what caused Preah Vihear to escalate from an unresolved minor issue, to a major  dispute. 
In response to Cambodia’s rejection of SEATO, the Thai government began to reinforce 
its border with Cambodia.  It built a border police checkpoint near Preah Vihear and 
raised its flag at Preah Vihear.90  One historian argues this did not represent a formal 
occupation of the temple that it was done in a private capacity by Thai forces in the 
region. However, Sihanouk interpreted it as a violation of Cambodian sovereignty and 
treated it as such.91   
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The relationship between Cambodia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
also complicated Thai-Cambodian relations. Sihanouk built a strong relationship with the 
PRC, at least in part to counter South Vietnam and Thailand.92  This relationship caused 
problems for Thai-Cambodian relations. Thailand had fought with the U.S. against North 
Korea and the PRC in the early 1950s and considered the PRC a threat. Moreover, on 
January 31, 1953, the PRC announced the establishment of a Tai Autonomous People’s 
government in the province of Yunnan. This was the ancestral home of the Tai people 
who migrated to Southeast Asia centuries earlier.93  It was perceived as an act of 
aggression by the Thai government. Additionally, the PRC harbored deposed leader Pridi 
Banomyong, who in 1954, called for the people of Thailand to revolt.94  
The relationship between Cambodia and the PRC was responsible, in large part, 
for derailing bilateral negotiations between Thailand and Cambodia in 1958. The Thai 
and Cambodian governments had made a tentative agreement to handle the Preah Vihear 
dispute at the ministerial level.95  However, just before the negotiations could take place, 
Sihanouk took a state trip to China and extended diplomatic recognition to the PRC. The 
Chinese and Cambodian governments issued a joint statement referring to hostile acts by 
Cambodia’s neighbors. 96 The Thai government reacted negatively to the statement as 
they believed it was directed at Thailand. In response, Thai leaders “…immediately 
declared a state of emergency in six provinces along the Cambodian frontier.”97  The two 
countries were at an impasse and Cambodia then took the case to the ICJ. 
When the ICJ rendered its decision in 1962, the Thai government did not want to 
accept it. Prime Minister Sari stated that Thai police defend Preah Vihear from any 
                                                 
92 Michael Liefer, "Cambodia: In Search of Neutrality," Asian Survey 3, no. 1, A Survey of Asia in 
1962: Part I (Jan. 1963): 59. 
93 Mills, Southeast Asia; Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics, 173.  The author spelled Tai 
as Thai. However “Thai” ( ไทย) is specific to people of the Thai Kingdom. “Tai” (ไท) refers to a more 
general ethnic category and includes several nationalities including the Thai, Lao, and Shan among others. 
94 Ibid., 173. 
95 Mills, Southeast Asia; Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics,  143. 
96 Jha, Foreign Policy of Thailand, 114–115. 
97 Roger M. Smith, Cambodia's Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), 143. 
 24
Cambodians trying to take control of it.98  Even when Sarit did make a statement 
accepting the decision, he hinted that Thailand might reclaim the temple in the future.99  
The Republic of China (ROC) ambassador to Thailand, Han Lih-Wu mentioned the Preah 
Vihear Temple dispute in his biography. After listening to Sarit lament the ICJ decision 
and discuss the outcry within Thailand, Han counseled Sarit to accept the court’s decision 
and then close the access to the temple on the Thai side of the border. Since the temple 
was only accessible from the Thai side, no Cambodians would be able to access it.100  
This is exactly what Sarit did. In an additional act of defiance, the Thai border police did 
not lower the Thai flag, but removed the entire flagpole with the flag still raised. The 
Thai interior minister said “There will be no lowering of the flag, for in the near future, 
we will have it back where it belongs.”101 
Though the strategic environment was partially responsible for the escalation of 
the Preah Vihear issue, it was also partially responsible for the Thai government’s 
acceptance of the decision. Prime Minister Sarit cited Thailand’s “…fine reputation in 
international affairs” as a reason for acceding to the decision. 102  However, there was 
more to it than just Thailand’s reputation. According to one historian, “[w]ith Laos 
already unstable, North Vietnam increasing its aggression against South Vietnam, and 
Cambodia developing close ties with Beijing, the Sarit regime had no intention of 
allowing this border dispute to escalate into a military conflict.”103  Moreover, none of 
Thailand’s SEATO allies extended any support to Thailand in its resistance to accepting 
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the ICJ decision.104  The Thai government was alone in its stance in an increasingly 
threatening Southeast Asia and did not want to draw the ire of the international 
community.  
The Thai leaders were upset with the decision and lack of support they received 
from their allies, as well as the U.S. posture towards Cambodia in general. Because the 
U.S. was committed to keeping Cambodia from growing any closer to the communist 
powers, it continued to supply military aid to Cambodia during the time of the Preah 
Vihear crisis.105  The Thai government was outraged that the U.S. provided military aid 
nonaligned Cambodia, which was an adversary, at the least. Additionally, the Thai 
government was insulted that former Secretary of State Dean Acheson represented the 
Cambodian government at the ICJ.106   
The Thai government took a page from Sihanouk’s foreign policy playbook to 
protest the injustice it perceived. Sihanouk was adept at playing all sides in the emerging 
conflict. In January of 1961, upset at the aid Cambodia was receiving, the Thai 
government announced “…that Thailand intended to follow a more flexible policy 
towards the Soviet Union.”107  After the Preah Vihear decision, Prime Minister Sarit 
announced that Thailand would “…exchange formal trade notes with Soviet Union.”108  
Additionally, at a critical time in the Geneva Conference on Laos, the Thai government 
announced a boycott of the SEATO and Lao conference. 109  Thailand, however, 
cancelled its boycott one month later. 110 
Relations between the two countries did not improve as a result of the decision, 
and forces clashed along the border intermittently for the next several years. While the 
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Preah Vihear dispute was technically settled, it lingered. Thai border policemen were 
injured in a border skirmish (after the decision) in August, prompting the Thai 
government to send reinforcements to the area around Preah Vihear.111   Thai and 
Cambodian forces battled at Preah Vihear as late as April and May of 1966. Thai forces 
seized it; Cambodian forces retook it, and then successfully defended a Thai counter 
attack.112  That same month, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman reportedly stated 
“Thailand reserves the right to appeal the decision if and whenever international appeals 
for machinery is set up.”113  In May of that year, the Cambodian press reported that 
Cambodian forces again repulsed a Thai attack on forces at Preah Vihear.114 
The discrepancy in the treaty documents between Thailand and France had 
existed for close to fifty years before it resulted in conflict over Preah Vihear. The dispute 
occurred, in large part, due to the different strategic alignment of Thailand and 
Cambodia. In addition to playing a role in the escalation of the issue, the government of 
Thailand accepted the ICJ decision because it was so dependent on the anti-communist 
powers. Even though the Thai government did accept the ICJ decision, skirmishing 
between military forces at the temple, as late as 1966, indicate that the issue was not 
completely resolved, at least in the eyes of many in Thailand. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The original Preah Vihear Temple dispute was a result of several factors. The 
direct historical cause was a discrepancy in documents associated with the early 1900s 
treaties between Siam and France. At the same time, the issue was an important domestic 
issue in both countries, but was not a result of domestic factions exploiting it for political 
gain. Leaders of both countries pursued the claim to Preah Vihear based on legitimate 
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foreign policy concerns. The strategic environment played a very important role in 
shaping the dispute. The mistrust between Thailand and Cambodia based on their 
different alignment in the emerging Cold War resulted in Thailand’s defensive build-up 
at the border. When the Thai border authorities built a police station at Preah Vihear, they 
raised their flag over the temple, which provoked a response from Cambodia. This 
triggered the escalation of the issue, resulting in the dispute. The strategic alignment also 
prevented a bilateral resolution. The timing of Cambodia’s recognition of the PRC 
derailed a ministerial level arrangement that may have resolved the dispute before it went 
to the ICJ. Once each country had committed to pursuing the issue, they broke diplomatic 
relations, and it took on a life of its own, culminating with the 1962 ICJ decision in 
Cambodia’s favor. While the Thai government did not want to abide by the decision, it 
was constrained by external factors and felt forced to accept. However, while ostensibly 
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III. INTER-DISPUTE PERIOD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses the period of time between the original and current Preah 
Vihear Temple dispute. It begins in 1967, when Cambodia had established control over 
the temple and covers up the surrender of the notorious Khmer Rouge at Preah Vihear in 
1998. The first portion of this chapter addresses the argument that domestic political 
turmoil is responsible for the Preah Vihear Temple dispute. It argues that periods of 
domestic instability, in both Thailand and Cambodia, did not result in the type of conflict 
over Preah Vihear that has occurred during the past several years.  
The second portion addresses the strategic environment during the period of 
study. First, it shows that many in Thailand still had an interest in the temple and 
considered the issue unresolved. Preah Vihear and the temple played a role in Thai-
Cambodian relations throughout the entire period. Secondly, it shows that while Preah 
Vihear was still an important issue to Thailand, greater threats and concerns to both 
countries eclipsed the issue. The strategic environment section is divided into three ten-
year sections.  
B. DOMESTIC POLITICAL FACTORS 
This section is not meant to be an in-depth study of domestic politics in each 
country. Its purpose is to highlight domestic instability in both countries that should have 
led to conflict at Preah Vihear, if domestic politics were the primary cause of the dispute. 
During the inter-dispute period, both Thailand and Cambodia encountered periods of 
domestic political unrest. The Thai government faced violent contests for political power 
in the 1970s and again in the early 1990s. In Cambodia, there were two periods of time 
when domestic political factions competing for power may have benefited from an appeal 
to nationalism. The first was the time period prior to the Lon Nol coup d’état against 
Sihanouk in 1970. The second was during the political maneuvering after the  
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Vietnamese occupation ended in the late 1980s. Yet, in contrast to earlier and later eras, 
the dispute over Preah Vihear did not occupy a prominent place in Thai-Cambodian 
relations.  
1. Thailand 
The Thai government faced significant internal political turmoil twice during this 
period of study. The political unrest of the early and mid-1970s and the early 1990s were 
both examples of conservative forces trying to keep other players from seizing too much 
political power.  According to Clark Neher, “[n]ational politics in Thailand has always 
involved very few people…”115  In both these cases, other factions within Thai society 
were attempting to gain a place in the Thai political process. They bear some similarity to 
Thailand’s recent political crisis.  If domestic politics in Thailand is to blame for the 
Preah Vihear Temple dispute, then these periods should have seen Thailand and 
Cambodia clash over Preah Vihear like they have recently. However, this did not happen. 
Field Marshall Thanom Kittikachorn was driven from power in 1973 due to mass 
protest. Thanom took control when Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat died in 1963.116  After 
experimenting with democratic reform, promulgating a constitution in 1968, and holding 
elections in 1969, Thanom staged a coup d’état against his own government. He took 
formal control in 1971 and many within Thailand did not respond favorably to Thanom’s 
takeover. Led primarily by students, but involving other segments of the population, the 
political protest began in the late 1960s and culminated in political violence.117 By 1973, 
widespread protests against Thanom’s government pitted demonstrators against the 
police and military. After his government fell, conservative forces battled against the  
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progressive elements for the next three years.118  In October of 1976, a riot broke out at a 
major university and counter-protestors, aided by police and military units, violently 
suppressed it.119  The military officially intervened and installed a new leader who 
presided over another period of authoritarian rule.120  
In the early 1990s, the Thai government faced more political unrest that ended in 
bloodshed. Again, it represented the conservative power-holding class fighting to 
maintain its stranglehold on political power. In 1991, the Thai military intervened and 
took control of the government.  In May of 1992, hundreds of thousands of people 
protested against the military intervention, provoking a violent crackdown.121  The 
situation was eventually resolved by the intervention of King Bhumipol.122  During both 
of these periods, the Preah Vihear Temple issue did not become the subject of a dispute 
between the two countries. 
2. Cambodia 
By the late 1960s, Sihanouk’s hold on power was beginning to unravel. He faced 
challenges from both the left and the right, as the domestic political environment was 
polarizing.123  In David Chandler’s analysis, the contest was between the “urban elite” 
and the rising left, with Sihanouk trying to placate both sides. Cambodian elite opinion 
was swinging towards the anti-communist, Lon Nol. This would seem like a good time 
for Sihanouk to exploit the temple issue. Thai troops had occupied the temple as recently 
as 1966 and the two countries had not yet restored diplomatic relations. While Sihanouk 
did often mention Preah Vihear during the late 1960s, he included it in the context of 
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threats to Cambodian sovereignty in general. It was not a singular issue and he did not 
appear to be exploiting the issue to garner domestic political support.  
Sihanouk did not last much longer as leader of Cambodia and two changes in 
government occurred in the 1970s. Sihanouk was deposed by General Lon Nol in March 
of 1970.124  The coup d’état had widespread support among the Cambodian elites, 
including the Cambodian parliament. During this transition period, Preah Vihear came up 
between Thailand and Cambodia, but instead of a source of tension, Lon Nol offered a 
concession on the temple, offering to share it with Thailand.125 Lon Nol’s leadership in 
Cambodia only lasted until April of 1975, when the Khmer Rouge took over Cambodia.  
The remarkable turmoil that occurred within Cambodia will be addressed in more 
detail in the following section; however, it is necessary to provide a few details here for 
the purpose of continuity. The Khmer Rouge government, known as Democratic 
Kampuchea (DK) lasted roughly three years. It was overthrown by the forces of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in late 1978.126  The Vietnamese installed and 
backed a tenant government of Khmer Rouge defectors called the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea (PRK). The Khmer Rouge fled to the Thai-Cambodia border region where 
they eventually joined with other Cambodian factions (including survivors of the Khmer 
Republic) in resistance to the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government. Vietnamese 
forces occupied Cambodia for over ten years, withdrawing the last of their forces in 1989.   
Following the departure of the Vietnamese forces, political factions (including the Khmer 
Rouge) were vying for political power in the closest thing to a democratic process that 
Cambodia had ever seen.127  The factions were unable to achieve peace, and the United 
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Nations (UN) intervened in 1991. The UN supervised elections in May of 1993.128  This 
period would seem suitable for exploitation of the Preah Vihear issue as the contest for 
power in Cambodia was contentious. The Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) narrowly lost 
the election to FUNCINPEC129 and resorted to violence (including murder), intimidation 
and fraud to impose its will. 130  The democratic process was somewhat of a failure, as 
the actual winners were forced to hand power over to the CPP, led by Hun Sen.  In this 
volatile political environment, Preah Vihear was apparently not a major issue between the 
two countries. In fact, amidst the process in the late 1980s, Hun Sen himself proposed 
that the two countries cooperate on the temple issue at a press conference in 1989.131   
All things being equal, the domestic unrest in both countries should have led to 
conflict over Preah Vihear if the explanation of domestic politics is complete. This 
demonstrates that domestic politics alone did not result in conflict over Preah Vihear in 
the interim period. It does not necessarily mean that domestic politics cannot cause 
conflict over Preah Vihear, however. The next section will show that during times of 
turmoil, both countries were occupied by other issues that rendered Preah Vihear just one 
concern among many during the period of study 
C. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
Between 1967 and 1998, the external environment shifted in several ways. 
Throughout those changes, the Preah Vihear Temple came up repeatedly between 
Thailand and Cambodia. The first section shows that the Thai and Cambodian 
governments were willing to compromise on the temple issue, at one point, in the face of 
greater threats. It also shows that later, the Thai government seemed willing to let the 
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issue go entirely, for a short time. The second section shows that during the Vietnamese 
occupation, Cambodia held the temple, but many in Thailand did not consider the issue 
resolved.  The third section shows that after the resolution of the international portion of 
the Cambodian conflict in 1988, the Cambodian government was again willing to 
compromise on the Preah Vihear issue. However, Phnom Penh soon lost its capability to 
exercise effective control over large portions of its territory, as well as Preah Vihear. In 
the early 1990s, the temple was threatened by fighting between Cambodian government 
forces and Khmer Rouge rebels. In 1993, the Khmer Rouge seized the temple and held it 
until they surrendered there in 1998. This section will show that the behavior of the Thai 
and Cambodian governments regarding Preah Vihear was both shaped and constrained by 
the strategic environment. 
1. Late 1960s to the late 1970s 
In 1967, a reporter observed that Preah Vihear had been relegated to a symbolic 
role in the still-contentious relationship between Thailand and Cambodia.132  The two 
countries still had not restored diplomatic relations. The most substantive issue between 
the two countries was still that of alignment. Specifically, the Cambodian government 
was still close to the communist powers in Asia and the Thai government was still close 
to the U.S. However, according to Sihanouk, the U.S. and its allies’ unwillingness to 
recognize Cambodian sovereignty were also preventing normalization. Sihanouk went so 
far as to say that if the Thai communists were to recognize Cambodian territorial claims, 
then Cambodia would recognize them as the legitimate government of Thailand.133  This 
may or may not have been hyperbole but it showed how important territorial sovereignty 
was to Cambodia. 
Regarding the temple itself, the government of Cambodia had legal possession, 
and after the skirmishing there as late as 1966, had physical control as well. However, 
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Preah Vihear was difficult to reach from the Cambodian side and the Thai government 
had closed its access after accepting the ICJ decision. From Sihanouk’s speeches 
throughout 1968, it is evident that he was still concerned that Thailand wanted to retake 
the temple. In February 1968, Sihanouk stated that Thailand intended to “seize…Preah 
Vihear someday.”134   Sihanouk mentioned Thai designs on Cambodian territory, and 
Preah Vihear specifically, several more times throughout 1968. Moreover, the issue, in 
the context of recognition of Cambodian sovereignty, was still playing a role in 
Cambodia’s foreign policy.  
Both Thailand and Cambodia were threatened by the communist forces in 
Southeast Asia. Cambodia’s relationships with North Vietnam and the PRC were not 
ideological, but pragmatic.135  Sihanouk thought it was the best way to preserve 
Cambodian sovereignty. However, Cambodia faced a subversive threat in the communist 
Khmer Rouge. Complicating the issue, the North Vietnamese communists were allied 
with the Khmer Rouge and moved freely in eastern Cambodia with Sihanouk’s reluctant 
permission.136  Cambodia did not have the capability to force the Vietnamese communists 
out of Cambodia. Thus, Sihanouk “allowed” them to stay there as this arrangement 
prevented open conflict in Cambodia. Thai opposition to communism was in large part 
ideological, but Thai communists posed a very real threat to the Thai government. The 
PRC supported the communists in Thailand. In the late 1960s, Thailand was facing 
communist insurgents in several areas of the country.137  From the late 1960s onward, 
Thai security forces clashed with communist insurgents in the Northern provinces.138  At 
the same time, the Thai government was threatened by Vietnamese communist pressure  
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in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. Despite the similar threats facing both countries, the 
late 1960s was a period of continued enmity.  1970, however, would see the Thai and 
Cambodian governments reconcile.  
An internal change within Cambodia produced a major shift in Cambodian 
foreign policy and strategic alignment. In March 1970, the anti-communist, Lon Nol, 
executed a coup d’état against Sihanouk.139   He reached out to the anti-communist 
powers and reestablished diplomatic relations with Thailand.140  The Thai government 
became an important ally of the new Khmer Republic as the survival of Lon Nol’s regime 
“depended on the supply lines from Thailand.”141  As part of its diplomacy with the Thai 
government, the Khmer Republic offered a noteworthy concession. Sihanouk took refuge 
in China and established an alliance with the enemy of his new enemy, the Khmer 
Rouge.142  
On May 18, 1970, the Cambodian Foreign Ministry stated that Cambodia would 
permit Thai nationals to worship at Preah Vihear.143  It stated further that the issue was 
not worth fighting over, as the real important issue was combating the communist threat 
to both countries. The Thai government responded favorably to the new policy and the 
Deputy Prime Minster of Thailand suggested sharing the costs of maintaining the 
temple.144  The compromise was in the interest of Cambodia as Thailand could provide 
ready access to the temple. The timing of the statement corresponded to a military 
exchange between the two countries. Lon Nol’s concession, and the Thai reaction to it, 
indicates that Preah Vihear was still a relevant issue to the Thais.  
The Preah Vihear Temple issue was relevant during the Khmer Republic period. 
When Sihanouk was overthrown in 1970, the arrangement between the Vietnamese 
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communists and the Cambodian government was nullified.  The Vietnamese communists 
were thus unconstrained and able to engage in open warfare in Cambodia.145  The 
Cambodian government requested Thai troops to aid in the defense of Phnom Penh. The 
Thai government refused, but did send troops to Preah Vihear in July 1970.146    
Communist propaganda in January 1972 mentioned the presence of Thai troops in 
Cambodia and at Preah Vihear, specifically.147  In October 1972, Sihanouk (who had 
allied with the Khmer Rouge after the coup), called for the overthrow of the Khmer 
Republic and addressed the issue of Preah Vihear, claiming that the current government 
had sold out the Cambodian people.148  The Thai military likely maintained a presence at 
the temple until the Khmer Republic fell in 1975.  
Due in large part to the corruption and incompetence of the Khmer Republic 
leaders, the Khmer Rouge were slowly taking over Cambodia. The Khmer Republic was 
able to hold them off only with the military assistance of the U.S. However, in 1973, the 
U.S. withdrew from Indochina.149  At the same time, internal domestic politics in 
Thailand, including the popular protests of 1973, led the Thai government to distance 
itself from the greater conflict in Indochina.150  This left the Khmer Republic alone. In 




                                                 
145 Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945, 201. 
146 "First Thai Troops Join in Cambodian Defence." Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), Jul 11, 
1970, 18, http://search.proquest.com/docview/156432793?accountid=12702 (accessed Sep 14, 2011). 
147 FBIS-FRB-72-016 Daily Report, January 24 1972, L4, 
http://docs.newsbank.com/s/HistArchive/fbisdoc/FBISX/12B3A460EF15F098/0D0CB5FC0F5C3AD5 
(accessed Sep 13, 2011). 
148 FBIS-FRB-72-197, Daily Report, White Book, October 6, 1972, H4, 
http://docs.newsbank.com/s/HistArchive/fbisdoc/FBISX/12B6254367516A18/0D0CB5FC0F5C3AD5 
(accessed Sep 13, 2011). 
149 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National 
Security Policy during the Cold War, Rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
314. 
150 Theeravit, Thai-Kampuchean Relations: Problems and Prospects, 566. 
 38
Kampuchea.151  In late April, the last troops of the Khmer Republic were garrisoned at 
Preah Vihear, cut off from their higher command.152  One of the last areas the Khmer 
Rouge took control of was Preah Vihear and the surrounding area.  
The Thai government responded to the new environment by establishing limited 
relationships with the communist powers in Asia. The Thai government, at this point, had 
begun to shift away from the anti-communist underpinnings of its foreign policy. It began 
to normalize relations with the PRC as it could no longer count on U.S. support.153  In 
keeping with its new foreign policy approach, the Thai government recognized 
Democratic Kampuchea on April 18, 1975; the day after the Khmer Rouge took over 
Phnom Penh.154  During the fighting, Deputy Prime Minister Praman Adireksan stated 
that the skirmishing at Preah Vihear was, “...the internal affair of Cambodia of which 
Thailand had nothing to do with…”155   
In a conciliatory gesture, the Thai government released a statement indicating that 
it would not interfere in Khmer Rouge access to the temple.156  However, the Khmer 
Rouge in the border region, including Preah Vihear, presented the Thai government with 
a difficult situation. Between 1975 and 1978, Khmer Rouge attacks in Thai territory 
claimed the lives of over two hundred Thai citizens.157  In February 1978, from their 
outpost at Preah Vihear, Khmer Rouge soldiers attacked a Thai border patrol police 
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garrison and burned it down, along with the homes in the compound.158  This was a 
blatant challenge to Thai sovereignty and directly involved Preah Vihear. However, in the 
strategic environment at the time, the Thai government feared pushing the Khmer Rouge 
closer to communist Vietnam.159  Ironically, the SRV ended up invading Democratic 
Kampuchea and pushing the Khmer Rouge, their former protégés into an alliance with 
the Thais.   
2. Late 1970s to the late 1980s 
The conflict in Cambodia, following the Vietnamese invasion was “the most 
bizarre and intricate conflict in recent history,” according to one observer.160   It involved 
several different actors including the U.S., PRC, (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) 
USSR, Thailand, and different Cambodian factions, including the Khmer Rouge. In 1984, 
opinion surveys indicated that Thai elites were almost unanimous in their perception of 
the SRV and its supporter, the USSR, as a threat to Thailand’s security.161  The issue 
dominated Thai foreign and security policy throughout the 1980s. Thailand was not 
strong enough to challenge Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia on its own, however. It 
depended on the support of outside powers, like the PRC and U.S. It also supported the 
resistance organization known as the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK), which was formed midway through 1982.162  It was comprised of 
FUNCINPEC, led by Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, represented by Khieu Samphan, and 
Son Sann of the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPLNF). 163  The most 
militarily capable, and arguably most important, were the Khmer Rouge.  
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The strategic environment at the time affected the behavior of the Thai 
government in two ways regarding the Preah Vihear temple issue. First, the effective 
government of Cambodia was the PRK, and it was supported/occupied by the SRV. 
Given the fact that the temple legally belonged to Cambodia, the government of Thailand 
was in no position to challenge it. Secondly, the Thai government had an incentive not to 
press territorial claims in general. The Thai government provided sanctuary to the 
resistance fighters along the border region in the yet-to-be demarcated frontier area 
between the two countries. Without the sanctuary provided by the Thai government, the 
resistance would have collapsed.164  However, because there was ambiguity in where the 
border actually was, the Thai government was able to deny that it was harboring the 
fighters in Thai territory.165  This does not mean that Preah Vihear was unaffected. 
Because it straddles the terrain feature that demarcates the Thai-Cambodia border in the 
region, it was a frequent subject of Cambodian press reporting. The Cambodian press 
accused Thai forces of flying reconnaissance over the temple on an almost weekly basis. 
Additionally, the Cambodian press reported that Thai forces shelled the temple area and 
even the temple itself on several occasions throughout the conflict.   
While the Thai government did not raise the ownership issue of Preah Vihear with 
the PRK, people within Thailand addressed it with Sihanouk as the head of state of the 
CGDK. The PRK was the effective government of Cambodia, while the CGDK was 
mostly refugees living in border camps. However, the CGDK still held the Cambodian 
seat at the UN.166  In 1982, shortly after the formation of the CGDK, Sihanouk was 
speaking at a press conference in Bangkok and reporters questioned him about Preah 
Vihear. One reporter asked what the status of the temple would be once Sihanouk (along 
with the CGDK) was in control in Cambodia. Sihanouk provided a vague response, 
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mentioning the need to respect the ICJ decision and letting “bygones be bygones.” 167  
Another reporter questioned him further, and asked specifically about revisiting the Preah 
Vihear decision, citing how important the issue was to many in Thailand. Sihanouk tried 
hard to remain noncommittal but intimated that the issue could be revisited in the future, 
if that was what both the Thai and Cambodian governments wanted.  
As late as 1985 and 1986, the issue was still evidently relevant to the relationship 
between the Thai government and CGDK. Diplomatic sources reported that a high level 
Thai official asked Sihanouk if the Preah Vihear Temple issue could be renegotiated. The 
same report claimed that the Thai government’s recognition of the CGDK was linked 
with the Preah Vihear issue.168  During a 1986 meeting, Sihanouk reportedly told Thai 
leader Prem Tinsulanonda, that Cambodia would share Preah Vihear with Thailand once 
he returned to power in Cambodia.169  If true, they indicate that some within Thailand 
sought an accommodation on the temple in exchange for Thailand’s assistance to the 
CGDK. At a minimum, they demonstrate that the issue was still a subject of discussion in 
Thailand. 
Sihanouk’s alleged compromises on Preah Vihear resonated in Cambodia, at least 
with the Cambodian press and leader Hun Sen. In a 1985 interview, Hun Sen claimed that 
“[Sihanouk]…was prepared to yield to the Thai demand for the return of the Preah 
Vihear Temple and the three provinces from Cambodia.”170  In 1986, Hun Sen sent a 
letter to the UN Secretary-General accusing the Thais of violating Cambodian territory 
because they were using incorrect maps. He complained that the Thai government did not 
adhere to the map that awarded Cambodia Preah Vihear in 1962 and alleged that the Thai 
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government planned to retake portions of Cambodian territory.171  In 1986, the 
Cambodian press reported on news stories circulating in Thailand. The Thai press was 
reporting that Sihanouk made a deal with the Thai government on the Preah Vihear issue. 
The article condemned the purported deal and alluded to Thai designs on retaking 
Cambodian territory.172  Again, at a minimum, these reports demonstrate that the Preah 
Vihear issue was still a subject of contention between the two countries.  
The antipathy between Vietnam and Cambodia lies in the history of the region, 
but what was largely responsible for the SRV invasion was Khmer Rouge attacks across 
the border into Vietnam.173  The Vietnamese government was not as reluctant to confront 
the Khmer Rouge as the Thai government was, and it responded with force. In December  
1978, forces of the SRV invaded and overthrew Democratic Kampuchea, establishing the 
PRK.174  The last forces of the Khmer Rouge held out at Preah Vihear then fled into 
Thailand in the same manner that the Khmer Republic forces had. By mid-July, the SRV-
backed Cambodian government had control over Preah Vihear.175  For the next decade, 
with SRV troops occupying Cambodia, the Thai government would not raise the issue 
with the PRK. However, it would raise the issue with Sihanouk as the head of the 
resistance coalition that sought refuge along the Thai-Cambodian border 
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3. Late 1980s to the late 1990s 
The next ten years brought another shift in the strategic environment that allowed 
for a normalization of Thai and Cambodian relations. In the late 1980s, the USSR, 
dealing with its own internal issues, began to pull support from its client states. It also 
began to normalize relations with the PRC. The USSR began to withdraw support for the 
SRV while the PRC agreed to begin pulling support from the Khmer Rouge. 176   This left 
Vietnam without its great power benefactor and it, in turn, began to withdraw from 
Cambodia, pulling the last of its troops out in September 1989.177  The various outside 
powers that had an interest in supporting the factions in the Cambodian conflict began to 
push for a political resolution to the internal conflict. The CGDK crumbled and the 
separate factions began to vie for a place in the new Cambodia.  
The SRV withdrawal from Cambodia was hugely significant to the Thai 
government. It marked the end of the issue that animated Thai foreign policy for ten 
years. Leszek Buszynski writes “[t]he anticipated end of the Cambodian conflict released 
Thailand from its obsession with national security.”178  This allowed for reconciliation 
between Bangkok and Phnom Penh and again, the issue of Preah Vihear came up. During 
a Bangkok press conference in May of 1989, Cambodian leader Hun Sen addressed the 
recent ceasefire in Cambodia. He stated that Thailand and Cambodia could cooperate on 
the Preah Vihear issue, suggesting that the countries make it accessible from both 
sides.179  At this point, the temple was virtually inaccessible from the Cambodian side 
due to the geography as well as landmines placed in the area during the previous periods 
of warfare. Partnering with Thailand would allow Cambodians access from the Thai side 
while Thais would gain Cambodian permission to enter the temple.   
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Thai and Cambodian officials did begin to cooperate on Preah Vihear but 
Cambodia’s internal security problem, namely the continued activities of the Khmer 
Rouge, slowed progress. By November 1991, Thai and Cambodian officials announced a 
plan to open the temple to tourists.180  However, fighting in the vicinity between 
Cambodian troops and the Khmer Rouge forced a delay.181  The temple was temporarily 
open from 1992 to 1993 and the two governments cooperated in its administration. The 
temple was under the notional control of Phnom Penh, but Thailand granted tourist 
permits. Thai officials also provided security and maintained the facilities for tourists.182   
In the meantime, negotiations failed to achieve peace in Cambodia and the UN 
intervened in 1992.183  However, according to David Chandler, “…(UNTAC) arrived too 
late and moved too slowly to gain the respect it needed from the Cambodian factions.”184  
The Khmer Rouge opted out of the peace agreements and began an insurgency against 
the Cambodian government. Despite the best efforts of the UN peacekeepers, the Khmer 
Rouge actually had increased the amount of territory it controlled by the time the UN 
forces withdrew from Cambodia in 1993.185  The Khmer Rouge controlled the territory 
on the Cambodian side of the border near Preah Vihear, which made it impossible for the 
government in Phnom Penh to exercise control over temple. This would have 
implications for the dispute.  
Though Bangkok and Phnom Penh began to cooperate after the Vietnamese 
withdrawal, there was tension within Thailand itself. While the Thai elites were unified 
during the occupation of Cambodia, the end of the Cambodian conflict created a rift 
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between the military and foreign ministry. Certain resistance-era arrangements proved 
resistant to change. There was tension between Bangkok and the military along the 
border, as the former supported the UN-sponsored peace plan in Cambodia, while 
elements within the Thai military still supported the Khmer Rouge.186   
The Thai government was a signatory on the 1991 peace agreement in Cambodia 
and complied with the UN prohibition on aiding the factions within Cambodia. However, 
“... [t]he United Nations later named Thailand as the biggest violator of the ban on log 
exports from Cambodia.”187  A senior Khmer Rouge official, Ieng Sary, acknowledged 
the arrangement when he stated, “…after the Paris Agreement was signed, ‘our Chinese 
friends stopped all assistance. So we had to sell some trees to the Thais to meet the 
immediate needs of the people.’”188  Illicit lumber sales represented one of the Khmer 
Rouge’s most important sources of revenue when outside support ceased.189  The funds 
that the Khmer Rouge generated allowed the organization it to sustain itself as an 
independent force in Cambodia.190   
Some Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) documented the illicit trade of 
lumber at the border well into the 1990s, but it was not until 1997 that the Thai 
government banned lumber imports from Cambodia. 191  In addition to lumber, the 
Khmer Rouge conducted a similar illicit trade in gems. It allowed Thai miners to access 
the rich areas it controlled. Estimates in 1993 put Khmer Rouge profits from the gem 
trade at around 3.8 million U.S. dollars per month.192  According to anthropologist  
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Lindsay French, the Thai military controlled traffic at the Thai-Cambodian border and the 
smuggling of gems and timber would not have been possible without their 
participation.193 
Other reporting indicates that elements within the Thai military maintained a 
relationship with the Khmer Rouge. For example, some Thai military personnel were 
reportedly complicit in the capture of UN officials on the Cambodian side of the border 
in 1993, and some sources indicate that Pol Pot himself was guarded by other Thai 
military in Thailand.194  In 1993, a New York Times reporter investigated the 
relationship and a senior Thai official stated that “we cannot end these relationships 
overnight…we need time.”195 In the same article, however, senior RTA leaders denied a 
relationship between the RTA and Khmer Rouge.  
The relationship between elements within the Thai military and the Khmer Rouge 
had implications for control over the Preah Vihear Temple, according to UN and 
Cambodian sources. In early July 1993, Khmer Rouge soldiers seized Preah Vihear from 
Cambodian government soldiers. Cambodian officials in Phnom Penh alleged that the 
Khmer Rouge took the temple with the assistance of Thai soldiers.196   UN officials in 
Phnom Penh made similar charges alleging that the “… the Khmer Rouge could not hold 
the temple without complicity from Thailand.”197 Thai officials denied the charges, 
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however. An RTA General pointed out that the Khmer Rouge seizure of Preah Vihear 
cost the Thai government tourism revenues.198   
Since the Cambodian government was unable to defeat the Khmer Rouge, it 
began to offer amnesty to some Khmer Rouge leaders. In 1996, the Cambodian 
government in Phnom Penh allowed a Khmer Rouge leader, Ieng Sary, to govern a semi-
autonomous region in western Cambodia as part of its plan to induce the Khmer Rouge to 
surrender.199  This brought much of the territory that generated the income so vital to the 
Khmer Rouge insurgency finally under Phnom Penh’s control.200    
The Khmer Rouge strength was finally waning as leaders began to turn on each 
other. However, Cambodian forces were still unable to dislodge the Khmer Rouge forces 
at Preah Vihear and in the surrounding area. In March of 1998, the Khmer Rouge 
stronghold of Anlong Veng, near Preah Vihear was taken by government forces.201  In 
December 1998, the Khmer Rouge officially surrendered in a ceremony at Preah Vihear 
that was broadcast on government television.202   When Phnom Penh took control of the 
temple, there were Thai military forces there as well.203 
D. CONCLUSION 
During the late 1960s, Cambodia controlled the temple but it was difficult for 
worshippers to reach because the Thai government prevented access to the temple 
following the ICJ’s decision in 1962. From 1970 to 1975, the Khmer Republic essentially 
shared the temple with Thailand. From 1975 to 1978, Khmer Rouge troops occupied the 
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temple while Thailand was trying to maintain a relationship with Democratic 
Kampuchea. From 1979 throughout the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, the temple 
was under the control of the PRK and Thailand did not officially challenge its status. 
However, during this period, the CGDK was the internationally recognized government 
of Cambodia and Thai reporters, as well as government officials, raised the issue with its 
head of state, Norodom Sihanouk. The resolution of the Cambodian conflict saw 
Thailand and Cambodia cooperate in the Preah Vihear issue from 1989 to 1993, though 
temple was closed intermittently due to continued fighting in the area. From 1993 to 
1998, Khmer Rouge rebels held the temple until they surrendered there in December. The 
Khmer Rouge surrender from then until the present day marks the longest stretch of time 
where a sovereign government of Cambodia has been able to exercise effective control 
over Preah Vihear.  
The current literature on the Preah Vihear Temple dispute generally assumes that 
the dispute was resolved in 1962 and contends that the dispute reemerged recently as a 
result of domestic politics in both countries. However, this chapter has shown that many 
within Thailand did not consider the matter settled, and Preah Vihear remained an 
important issue to many within Thailand throughout the intervening period. Despite its 
importance, domestic political turmoil did not result in the politicization of the Preah 
Vihear issue that we ostensibly see today. This chapter also argued that the importance of 
the issue, and domestic political turmoil notwithstanding, external events shaped both 





IV. RECENT DISPUTE: 1999–2011 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Almost 50 years after the decision on the original Preah Vihear dispute, the issue 
is back at the ICJ. The current case is not about the temple itself, but the territory 
surrounding the temple. On April 28, 2011, Cambodia brought the case back to the ICJ 
requesting a clarification of the 1962 decision.204  The court released a provisional ruling 
on July 18, 2011, instructing the governments of Thailand and Cambodia to withdraw 
their troops from the territory surrounding the temple, pending a formal decision on the 
case.205  While the dispute has only recently made its way back to the ICJ, the Preah 
Vihear issue, closely linked to border demarcation, reemerged over ten years ago. This 
chapter will examine Preah Vihear as a subject of dispute between Thailand and 
Cambodia since the Khmer Rouge surrender in 1998. It will address the historical legacy, 
domestic politics in both countries and changes in the external environment. It argues that 
the current dispute is primarily a result of conflicting historical claims, exacerbated by 
Thailand’s domestic political situation.  Further, the issue of Preah Vihear specifically, 
and border demarcation in general, reemerged soon after Cambodia was once again able 
to exercise effective control over its territory. 
B. HISTORICAL FACTORS 
Judging from the positions of the Thai and Cambodian governments at the ICJ, 
conflicting historical claims are directly responsible for the current dispute. The 
disagreement between the governments of Thailand and Cambodia is a result of the same 
discrepancies in the documents associated with the early 1900s treaties, as well as 
different interpretations of the 1962 decision itself. The Thai government argues that the 
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1962 ruling only addressed the temple and did not cover the surrounding territory. The 
Cambodian government, in comparison, argues that the ICJ decision did include the 
territory surrounding Preah Vihear and that the boundary should conform to the 1907 
map that the court cited in its decision. In addition to the technical disagreement, the 
dispute also has to do with more general conflicting historical claims. This is illustrated 
by the fact that other temples along the border have become the subject of dispute as 
well. These conflicting claims had not gone away; they had only been rendered irrelevant 
during the previous era of turmoil in Southeast Asia, and in Cambodia especially.  
After the surrender of the Khmer Rouge in late 1998, Thailand and Cambodia 
demonstrated a willingness to compromise on Preah Vihear. Thai authorities allowed 
access to the temple from Thailand, and Cambodian authorities allowed access to the 
temple itself. Additionally, landmines left over from the previous era of warfare menaced 
the area and the two countries worked together to clear them.206  The governments of 
Thailand and Cambodia began to negotiate on the matter of border demarcation, and in 
2000, signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that established a joint boundary 
commission (JBC) to demarcate the border.207  Despite the cooperation, however, 
tensions were soon evident.   
Cooperation soon gave way to discord over border demarcation in general, and 
Preah Vihear, specifically. Some within Thailand questioned the validity of the maps 
from 1907 arguing that more recent maps should be used.208  Citing the need to protect 
Cambodian territory from Thai incursion, in 2000, Cambodian military officials in the 
Preah Vihear province office called for a buildup at the border.209  By February of 2000, 
Preah Vihear itself had become an increasingly popular tourist destination, though it was 
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intermittently closed for mine clearing operations.210  While both countries had an interest 
in cooperating, an agreement between the tourism ministries of each country proved 
controversial in Cambodia.  The tourism director of Cambodia, responsible for the deal, 
was demoted by King Sihanouk at the request of Hun Sen in July 2001.211  More 
controversially, in December of that year, the Thai border authorities closed access to the 
temple, claiming that Cambodian vendors were polluting the Thai side of the border.212  
The deputy governor of Preah Vihear claimed that Thailand had closed the temple as part 
of a plan to take Cambodian territory.213       
Preah Vihear was closed from the Thai side until May of 2003, which, along with 
other emerging disputes along the border, contributed to increasing anti-Thai sentiment in 
Cambodia. In January, the ownership of two additional temples on the border came into 
question.214  The Thai department of fine arts had been working on restoring the temples 
for several years, but the Cambodian government sent a letter to the Thai Foreign 
ministry claiming that they belonged to Cambodia. The Thai foreign minister insisted that 
the temples were in Thai territory stating, "We can guarantee that the government would 
never give the temples to Cambodia."215  Thailand’s closure of its access to Preah Vihear, as well 
as the reports of the other disputed temples helped set the conditions for the riots that took place 
in Phnom Penh in January 2003.216   
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The infamous riots occurred after the Cambodian press reported (erroneously) that 
a popular Thai actress claimed that Angkor Wat (Cambodia’s most famous temple) 
should be returned to Thailand.217   The reports provoked a frenzied response as angry 
mobs burned down the Thai Embassy and attacked several Thai-owned businesses.218  In 
Thailand, thousands of protestors converged on the Cambodian embassy in Bangkok 
prompting an intervention by King Bhumipol.219  Though the issue temporarily disrupted 
Thai and Cambodian relations, the two governments worked together to prevent an 
escalation. Border demarcation and Preah Vihear, however, remained an irritant in Thai-
Cambodian relations. 
Later, when the issue escalated in 2008, other temples located in disputed 
territories were dragged into the conflict. In August 2008, Thai and Cambodian forces 
faced off at Ta Muen Thom, one of the temples that had been disputed in 2003. Military 
leaders at the site were able to avoid a clash but ownership of the temple remained in 
dispute. Spokesmen from both countries reported that the temple belonged to their own 
country.220  In September, the Thai government lodged a diplomatic protest with the 
Cambodian government claiming that Cambodian troops were encroaching on Ta Kwai, a 
temple near the border, but in Thailand. A Cambodian government spokesman reported 
that Thai soldiers were encroaching on Ta Krabei, a temple in Cambodia.221  They were 
talking about the same temple. In mid-October of the same year, after clashes at Preah 
Vihear, both sides reinforced positions at the other two temples and in April of 2011, 
Thai and Cambodian troops clashed near both temple sites.222 
                                                 
217 Angkor Wat was under Siamese control prior to the French Colonial era. 
218 Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 294.  
219 Hinton, "Khmerness and the Thai 'Other': Violence, Discourse and Symbolism in the 2003 Anti-
Thai Riots in Cambodia," 450. 
220 Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “Thai Troops Still at Ta Muen Thom, General Says,” The Nation 
(Thailand), August 7, 2008, 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/08/06/national/national_30079953.php. 
221 Thanida Tansubhapol, “Official Protest Handed to Cambodia,” Bangkok Post (Thailand), 
September 17, 2008 (accessed via Newsbank: World News Database). 
222 “Troops clash on border,” Bangkok Post (Thailand), October 16, 2008; “Ties with Cambodia in 
danger,” Bangkok Post (Thailand), April 26, 2011, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/233704/ties-
with-cambodia-in-danger. 
 53
While much of the Thai-Cambodian border has yet to be properly demarcated, the 
presence of ancient Khmer temples in disputed territory exacerbates the problem. The 
temples are historically and culturally significant in both countries (though more so in 
Cambodia). Alexander Hinton demonstrates the importance of Khmer architecture in 
Cambodia.223  While Angkor Wat and Preah Vihear are the most famous examples of 
Khmer architecture, a network of ancient temples spans the territory of the former Khmer 
Empire, including modern Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. Most are located well within 
the national borders of a country and ownership is not in question (though can still be an 
emotional issue as the Phnom Penh riots demonstrate). Problems can occur when the 
temples lie in disputed territory.  
Scholars illustrate the importance of Khmer temples in Thai history and culture as 
well. Anthropologist Charles Keyes writes, “[t]he heritage of Angkor does not, however 
belong unequivocally to the Khmer; it has also been claimed by the Thai.”224  He shows 
that Khmer history, specifically Khmer temples such as Phnom Rung, have been 
partially, if selectively, incorporated into Thai history.225  Thai historian, Charnvit 
Kasetsiri, describes the links between Thai and Cambodian culture, “…especially true of 
royal customs, language, writing systems, vocabulary, literature, and the dramatic 
arts.”226  In the past, Thai leaders incorporated elements of the Khmer legacy into Thai 
culture. King Mongut (Rama IV) even attempted to have a Khmer temple dismantled and 
reassembled within the territory of Siam, and when that effort failed, he had a model of 
Angkor Wat built at the temple of the emerald Buddha in Bangkok.227  The fact that both 
countries make historical claims to the same legacy causes conflict when symbols of that 
                                                 
223 Hinton, "Khmerness and the Thai 'Other': Violence, Discourse and Symbolism in the 2003 Anti-
Thai Riots in Cambodia," 455. 
224 Charles F. Keyes, “The Case of the Purloined Lintel: The Politics of a Khmer Shrine in as a Thai 
National Treasure,” in National Identity and its Defenders: Thailand 1939–1989: ed. Craig J. Reynolds 
(Clayton, Vic: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies), 264. 
225 Keyes, “The Case of the Purloined Lintel: The Politics of a Khmer Shrine in as a Thai National 
Treasure,” 265. 
226 Charnvit Kasetsiri, “Thailand-Cambodia: A Love-Hate Relationship,” Kyoto Review of Southeast 
Asia 3, March 2003. 
227 Charnvit Kasetsiri, “Thailand-Cambodia: A Love-Hate Relationship,” Kyoto Review of Southeast 
Asia 3, March 2003. The same emerald Buddha that France tried to have returned in Vientiane after WWII. 
 54
legacy fall in disputed territory. While the role of ancient Khmer culture and architecture 
is important, more recent history is still important as well.  
A 2010 opinion piece published in a prominent English language newspaper in 
Thailand provides more evidence that the Preah Vihear issue is closely related to the 
concept of loss, as described by Tongchai Winichakul and Shane Strate. They argue that 
the Thai government is mishandling the situation with Cambodia and Thailand and is at 
risk of “losing” territory in the same manner that it lost Laos and Cambodia to colonial 
France. Additionally, they contend that Thailand did not actually accept the 1962 
decision and has the right to appeal. The article concluded with the foreboding 
declaration that “Thai soldiers on the border are on high alert. If the first warning goes 
unheeded, we should reserve the right, under our sovereignty, to drive out any nationals 
infringing upon our land.”228  This article is not a statement of policy but it reflects a view 
of the dispute that some in Thailand still hold. It indicates that the notion of historic loss 
is still relevant in Thailand.  
Conflicting historical claims are very relevant to tension at the border since 2000. 
The underlying causes of the original dispute, never actually rectified, have again become 
important. The historical and cultural importance of Khmer temples to both Thailand and 
Cambodia are another element of the dispute. While this section showed that the tensions 
at the border and over Preah Vihear emerged several years before the onset of Thailand’s 
domestic political problems, the next section will show that those domestic problems in 
Thailand have indeed played an important role in shaping the dispute. 
C. DOMESTIC POLITICAL FACTORS 
1. Thailand 
The political unrest in Thailand associated with the recent troubles over Preah 
Vihear began with the coup d’état against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 
September of 2006. The coup that resulted began a period of what one analyst describes 
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as “political pandemonium,” consisting of a military junta, constitutional reform, multiple 
elections, and judicial involvement in the political process.229  In the midst of that 
turmoil, the Preah Vihear Temple became a divisive political issue, resulting in a drastic 
escalation.  
During the Thaksin era, Thailand and Cambodia were able to separate 
disagreements over border demarcation matters from their overall relationship, but 
tensions were still evident. In September 2003, after Thai authorities reopened access to 
the temple, Thai and Cambodian soldiers nearly clashed over a building in disputed 
territory near Preah Vihear.230  In January 2004, a Thai academic suggested that 
Cambodia relinquish Preah Vihear to Thailand to compensate for the damage done to 
Thai property during the January 2003 riots. The comments resonated in Cambodia so 
much that the Thai Ambassador sent a message to the Cambodian government assuring 
them that the view did not reflect the opinions of the Thai government or people.231  
Other positive action included the Thai government agreeing to support Cambodia’s 
application for Preah Vihear UNESCO inscription back in 2004.232  In May of 2005 
however, Thai and Cambodian troops faced off near Preah Vihear.233  The two countries 
were able to compartmentalize border issues because their relationship was otherwise 
good. 
Thai foreign policy under Thaksin was largely responsible for the strong 
relationship between Thailand and Cambodia. His government actively pursued 
relationships with Thailand’s neighbors, linking them with private sector investment.234  
His foreign policy combined with regional business development benefited Thailand as 
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well as him, personally. Thaksin’s businesses, including his mobile phone company, did 
business in Cambodia.235  His bank was also financing road development in 
Northwestern Cambodia.236  He thus had a strong incentive to maintain good relations 
with Cambodia. Critics seized on this, alleging that Thaksin compromised Thai interests 
to serve his own. Regardless of his motives, Thaksin’s foreign policy helped maintain a 
good relationship with the Cambodian government, which helped prevent the escalation 
of border demarcation issues..  
The military junta that overthrew Thaksin did not drastically alter policy over 
Preah Vihear. Calling itself the Council on National Security (CNS), the military deposed 
Thaksin on September 19th, 2006.237  The CNS stated that it supported Cambodia’s 
UNESCO application for Preah Vihear, in principle, but wanted to settle the demarcation 
matter of the territory near Preah Vihear before officially giving its support.238  As a 
result of the outstanding demarcation concerns, the World Heritage Committee voted to 
delay the inscription for a year, in anticipation of the two countries resolving their border 
issues.239  Cambodian border authorities temporarily closed Preah Vihear in what seemed 
to be a bit of retaliation.240  Eventually, the CNS agreed to support Cambodia’s bid, 
though it was concerned about the possible impact on Thai territory.241  At this point, 
Thailand and Cambodia did not see eye to eye on Preah Vihear, but there were no serious 
issues resulting from it. 
Preah Vihear became a major political issue in Thailand and a more serious factor 
in Thai-Cambodian relations for the government that followed the CNS. The 
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constitutional court dissolved Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party in May.  The TRT 
however, reconstituted as the People’s Power Party (PPP), winning a decisive victory in 
the December 2007 election.242  Samak Sundravej was appointed leader of the PPP, 
becoming Prime Minister, though he openly functioned as proxy for Thaksin.243  Samak’s 
administration came under immediate attack from the political opposition, including the 
Democrat Party led by Abhisit Vejjajiva, and its allies, the People’s Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD). In this contentious environment, the Preah Vihear Temple issue 
became an effective tool for attacking the current government.  
In May of 2008, Thai Foreign Minister, Noppadon Pattama signed a joint 
communiqué with Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia Sok An, expressing Thailand’s 
support for Cambodia’s UNESCO application for Preah Vihear.244  On July 8, the WHC 
voted to inscribe Preah Vihear.245  The foreign ministry’s position prompted protests 
from the PAD and the Democrat Party. The PAD protested in Bangkok, as well as at the 
temple site itself. Abhisit launched into a tirade against Noppodon and Samak, accusing 
them of lying about the temple and violating the Thai constitution. He alluded to both the 
Thai government’s nonacceptance of the 1962 decision and government’s right to 
appeal.246  Political rhetoric notwithstanding, the official position of the Democrat Party 
was that the UNESCO inscription affected border demarcation and thus required the 
approval of parliament, according to the constitution.247  Noppadon and the incumbent 
government disagreed, arguing that the Thailand support was only for the temple itself 
and that the disputed territory around it would not be affected.  
The continued domestic turmoil in Thailand would see the escalation of the Preah 
Vihear issue, and the downfall of Noppadon, Samak, and the PPP. Noppodon defended 
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the government’s policy, pointing out that he conferred with military officials at the 
border to ensure that the map included with the communiqué did not compromise 
Thailand’s territory.248  The controversy continued, however, and Noppadon resigned 
under the pressure.249  In September 2008, Samak was also forced to resign as a result of 
trumped up charges in the increasingly antagonistic political environment. 250  From 
September onward, the border situation escalated with military buildups at Preah Vihear, 
Ta Muen Thom and Ta Kwai. In October, Thai and Cambodian troops exchanged fire at 
Preah Vihear for the first time.251  Meanwhile, the PAD ratcheted up their campaign 
occupying the Suvarnaphumi Airport in Bangkok in December 2008, rendering it 
unusable. In December, the constitutional court dissolved the PPP, charging the party 
with electoral fraud.252  Instead of holding elections, the Democrat Party was able to 
form a coalition and Abhisit became Prime Minister.253   
Abhisit became prime minister on December 15, 2008 and faced a contentious 
atmosphere similar to the one his party helped create. While the previous government 
faced the protest of the PAD, Abhisit’s government faced similar street protestors in the 
United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), known as the red-shirts. The 
Preah Vihear issue remained relevant under the new prime minister. Abhisit and his party 
had painted themselves into a corner on Preah Vihear while in the opposition. Noppadon 
called on Abhisit to stay true to his word and pursue the Preah Vihear issue now that he 
was prime minister. He stated “Mr. Abhisit and his government should be given the 
chance to work. But be warned that the efforts to encourage reconciliation will never 
materialise if the prime minister is something of a hypocrite."254  Noppadon had not 
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changed his position on Preah Vihear, however, and was just making the point that 
Abhisit was constrained by his previous position. Abhisit’s position, however, was that 
his government was constrained by Noppadon’s signing of the joint communiqué in back 
in June of 2008.255 
Thai analysts argue that the Abhisit government’s policies on Preah Vihear were 
politically motivated, once he was in office. According to Pavin Chachavalpongpun, he 
used the Preah Vihear issue, while in office, in an attempt to shore up support as his poll 
numbers were falling.256  Under Abhisit, the Thai government took proactive steps to 
reverse the support earlier governments had given. In June 2009, the Thai government 
began to campaign for the delisting of Preah Vihear.257  Later, it allocated money to 
campaign against Cambodia’s management plan for temple.258  This was significant 
because the inscription process is not complete until a management plan is approved. 
Those efforts notwithstanding, Abhisit’s government faced pressure from the PAD who 
had taken a more extreme position on Preah Vihear than the Abhisit government. The 
PAD advocated for the cancellation of the MOU signed in 2000, which was the basis for 
the demarcation effort. 259   By February 2011, the PAD was protesting against Abhisit’s 
government, criticizing his handling of Preah Vihear.260  Abhisit’s government was 
facing pressure from all sides.  
Tensions over Preah Vihear lasted the duration of Abhisit’s term, while improving 
after he left office. Thai and Cambodian soldiers skirmished again at Preah Vihear in 
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April  2009, January 2010 and February 2011. 261  Further clashes occurred at Preah 
Vihear in April 2011 and the disputed temples of Ta Muen Thom and Ta Kwai/Ta 
Krabei.262  Abhisit led throughout a period of widespread protest and tense relations with 
Cambodia. Having never really achieved a position of stability, his government lost the 
most recent election to the Peua Thai Party (PTP), which selected Thaksin’s younger 
sister, Yingluck Shinawatra as Prime Minister.  She assumed office in August.263  Thai 
and Cambodian relations have since showed signs of improvement. 
2. Cambodia 
Analysts argue that Hun Sen and his party have benefited from the controversies 
over Preah Vihear, including the UNESCO listing and the boundary dispute with 
Thailand. Following the UNESCO listing, Cambodians were celebrating in the streets of 
Phnom Penh as the government and people celebrated.264  Hun Sen and the CPP 
leveraged the UNESCO listing as the elections were approaching. 265  Another observer 
notes that Cambodian leaders commonly exploit Cambodia’s archaeological heritage for 
political gain.266   This does not mean, however, that domestic political concerns are 
responsible for Cambodia’s behavior in the Preah Vihear Temple dispute. The most 
serious events in the Preah Vihear temple dispute (2008–2011) occurred after the 
elections, at a time when Hun Sen and his party had a firmer grasp on Cambodian politics 
than ever before.  
Some observers argue that Hun Sen seized on the comments by the Thai actress in 
January 2003 because elections were coming up in July. When the Cambodian press 
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reported the story, Hun Sen joined in the fray, publicly condemning and insulting the 
actress who supposedly made the comments.267  He was responsible, in part, for the 
nationalist frenzy that resulted. However, he did not pursue the issue any further after the 
initial melee. His government worked with the Thai government to repair the relationship 
between Thailand and Cambodia. If he wanted to exploit something, he could have 
exploited the Preah Vihear issue in the run up to elections. Thai border authorities closed 
Preah Vihear in 2001 until May of 2003, before the elections. Moreover, the CPP did not 
win a majority and it took an additional year to form a governing coalition. Hun Sun 
came under pressure to step down as head of the CPP, though he did not.268   If he had 
really wanted to exploit the Preah Vihear issue for political gain, it seems that he would 
have done so when he was politically most vulnerable. Instead, the most contentious 
period in the Preah Vihear dispute came after Hun Sun had already consolidated his 
position.  
The most recent election in Cambodia occurred in July 2008. It brought the 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) an overwhelming majority of seats in the Cambodian 
National Assembly. The CPP is now more popular and powerful than ever before, and 
Cambodia is likely to remain a one-party state for the foreseeable future.269   The 
elections of 2008 corresponded to the political turmoil in Thailand and its discord over 
Preah Vihear.  Observers note that the Preah Vihear issue has benefited Hun Sen. The 
UNESCO listing in July helped Hun Sen’s popularity.270  Noting the overwhelming 
victory of the CPP, Caroline Hughes argues that the Preah Vihear issue, inter alia, was 
responsible for a “…highly favorable environment in which the 2008 elections were 
held…”271  While Hun Sen has benefitted from the controversy, the timing of the 
controversy does not really match the electoral cycle in Cambodia. As Kitti Prasirtsuk 
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notes, Hun Sen did not adopt a more conciliatory position on the Preah Vihear issue after 
the elections were over.272  Since the elections of 2008, Hun Sen and the CPP have had a 
near monopoly on power. However, it was after Hun Sen and the CPP achieved their 
firmest grasp on power in Cambodia that the Preah Vihear dispute really escalated. 
D. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
The most important change in the strategic environment and the one that made the 
dispute possible again, is the absence of the outside powers that shaped Southeast Asia up 
through the early 1990s. The effect of that change was delayed by Cambodia’s continued 
internal strife, which ended in the late 1990s. An additional change is Cambodia’s 
membership in ASEAN, which was initially resistant to involvement in the dispute, but 
has demonstrated an increasing willingness to play a role. A familiar actor in the dispute 
is the ICJ, which has recently become involved again. ICJ decisions seem an important 
factor in shaping both countries’ behavior.  
The end of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), in 
1993, marked Cambodia’s reemergence as an independent country. The Cambodian 
government in Phnom Penh, however, lacked the capability to exercise effective control 
over its territory. Only after the Khmer Rouge surrender in 1998 could the government in 
Phnom Penh function as the sovereign government of Cambodia. After sorting through 
some further political problems in 1999, Cambodia was at peace and not basically 
controlled by outside powers.273   This represented a new dynamic for the government of 
Thailand as well. For the first time, it had to contend with a truly independent and 
sovereign Cambodia in an environment free from outside influence. Essentially, 1999 is 
when border disputes actually became a possibility between the two countries and the 
issue of Preah Vihear became relevant again.274 
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Along with Cambodia’s sovereignty came their acceptance into ASEAN, which 
has emerged as another source of influence in the Preah Vihear dispute. Though the 
organization was founded in 1967, Cambodia was the last country admitted, joining only 
in 1999.275  Some analysts, as well as various political actors, believe that ASEAN has a 
role to play in the resolution of the conflict with Cambodia. Amitav Acharya writes that 
“…ASEAN membership seems to be a factor in restraining the two sides from escalating 
the issue further.”276  At the ASEAN summit in July 2011, Secretary of State Clinton 
stated that ASEAN was the appropriate venue to resolve the Preah Vihear issue.277  
Additionally, UNSC and the ICJ both said that ASEAN should have a role in resolving 
the dispute.278  Other observers, however, have been less optimistic regarding the 
prospect of ASEAN involvement. One writes, “It will also expose yet another dimension of 
ASEAN's structural impotence and operational inefficacy, notwithstanding the problematic 
ASEAN Charter.”279   
ASEAN itself is now willing to help resolve the dispute after initially refusing. 
When the dispute began to escalate in July of 2008, members were resistant to assuming 
a conflict resolution role.280  As the dispute dragged on however, ASEAN has changed 
its stance and decided that is does have a role to play in the conflict. In November 2009, 
the Secretary General of ASEAN, who is also a  Thai Democrat Party member, appealed 
to ASEAN’s foreign ministers to aid in the resolution of the conflict citing the Treaty of 
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Amity and Cooperation (TAC).281  As part of its provisions, the TAC calls for the 
“[m]utual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and 
national identity,” and “[r]enunciation of the threat or use of force.”282  Surin also 
appealed to Thailand to accept an offer from Indonesia to help mediate the conflict.283    
The governments of Thailand and Cambodia have different opinions on the 
prospect of third party arbitration. Thai leaders insist on a bilateral solution while 
Cambodian leaders have sought third party involvement since the dispute escalated in 
2008. In July of 2008, Thai government sources reported that Thailand would not allow 
an ASEAN role in resolving the dispute, stating that it would be solved bilaterally.284  In 
August of 2010, the Thai government again rejected ASEAN involvement, insisting on a 
bilateral resolution. In addition to bringing the issue to ASEAN, Cambodia has appealed 
to the UN. In February 2010, Cambodia sent a letter to the UNSC accusing Thailand of 
violating the UN charter in a move that prompted the Thai government to send a response 
rebutting the charges.285  In February 2011, while Thai and Cambodian troops were again 
clashing near Preah Vihear, the UNSC requested that the foreign ministers of Thailand 
and Cambodia, as well as the ASEAN chairman, provide briefings on the Preah Vihear 
dispute.286  This represented a victory, of sorts, for Cambodia as well as high level 
recognition for an ASEAN role in resolving the dispute. The differing positions of each 
government on the issue of outside arbitration are understandable. Entities within the 
Thai government probably realize they stand a greater chance of losing in a situation with 
third party arbitration. Additionally, while Thailand is accustomed to playing a  
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leadership role in ASEAN and sending its troops to other Southeast ASEAN countries, it 
is not accustomed to third party involvement in its own problems. Cambodia, on the other 
hand, is accustomed to such involvement. 
There is precedent for ASEAN involvement in Cambodia. At the early stages of 
the Cambodian conflict, after the SRV invasion, ASEAN lobbied to keep the UN 
diplomatic credentials in the hands of Democratic Kampuchea and then the CGDK. Of 
course, Cambodia was not a member at that time. ASEAN intervened in Cambodia again 
more recently.  When Cambodia was going through the process of becoming an ASEAN 
member, Hun Sen moved against his co-prime minister in the internal coup of 1997.  As a 
result, ASEAN delayed Cambodia’s admittance into the organization. Hun Sen was 
forced to consent to ASEAN monitoring the elections in 1998, after which the 
organization admitted Cambodia in 1999.287  The precedent of ASEAN involvement in 
Cambodia may also help to explain Cambodia’s desire for ASEAN involvement. 
Additionally, as in the first case, Cambodia is the weaker country and outside 
intervention will ensure a more level playing field. 
While some may speculate that ASEAN membership has exerted a stabilizing 
effect on Cambodia and Thailand in the Preah Vihear dispute, the ICJ’s influence appears 
to be much more substantial. Despite the lingering historical claims and the domestic 
influences in Thailand, the official position of the Thai government is that the 1962 
decision stands.  This demonstrates that the Thai government respects the authority of the 
ICJ, no matter how unpleasant many in Thailand find the decision. Moreover, both 
countries have stated that they will obey the order of the ICJ and withdraw their troops 
from the area surrounding Preah Vihear. The real test will be when the ICJ rules on the 
matter of the disputed territory around the temple. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The current Preah Vihear Temple dispute is a result of several different variables. 
The first is the matter of conflicting historical claims. As Thitinan Pongsudhirak points 
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out, “[h]istorical tensions run deep on both sides.”288   The shared culture and history 
engenders competition that leads to conflict over temples in disputed territory.  
Additionally, the ambiguity of the documents associated with the 1904–1907 treaties is 
still very important, and was not resolved by the 1962 ICJ decision. Domestic politics in 
Thailand played an important role in the escalation of the dispute in 2008, but were not 
the cause of the dispute. The dispute began to reemerge, however, after the late 1990s 
when Cambodia was once again able to exercise effective control over its territory. 
Thailand’s political situation has stabilized, for the time being, and relations between the 
two countries are improving, but the matter of the territory surrounding Preah Vihear is 
still outstanding. The ICJ will issue a decision on the matter at some point in the future. 
After the original ICJ decision, an observer asked, “…is the dispute over, or has it merely 
been suspended?”289  That question is equally fitting at this point. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the causes of the Preah Vihear 
Temple dispute. To that end, it evaluated three explanations over three different time 
periods since the 1950s. The first was the matter of conflicting historical claims, mainly 
rooted in the colonial era but also traceable to much earlier eras. The second was the 
issue of domestic politics in both countries, but primarily Thailand. This is the most 
common explanation for the recent period of dispute. The third was the effect of the 
strategic environment in the dispute. To assess these explanations, this thesis examined 
three periods since the 1950s: the original dispute (1954–1966), the inter-dispute period 
(1968–1998) and the time period leading up to and including the recent military clashes 
(1998–1999). This thesis argues that the most important and consistent cause of the Preah 
Vihear dispute is that of conflicting historical claims; the other two explanations help to 
account for the dispute during some periods, but not all.. Currently, the dispute appears to 
be in a lull as both countries await another ICJ decision. The court has recently 
authorized both countries to submit additional documentation.290 
In the original case, conflicting historical claims along with the Thai and 
Cambodian governments’ different responses to internal and external threats, led to the 
dispute. Thais and Cambodians both maintain longstanding claims on much of the same 
territory. Depending on how far back one goes in history, both sides have justifiable 
claims. The Khmer Empire, the precursor to modern day Cambodia, included most or all 
of modern day Thailand. In more recent history, much of modern Cambodia was under 
the suzerainty of Siam, the precursor to modern Thailand. Many in Thailand believe that 
modern Cambodia (as well as other territories) was taken unjustly from Siam (now 
Thailand) during the colonial era. Though historians Thongchai Winichakul and Shane 
Strate argue that Thailand’s “losses” are largely a myth, the belief resonates among many 
in Thailand, and that is what makes it important. Additionally, there is an acute cause 
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embedded in the historical record: discrepancies in the documents associated with the 
early 1900s treaties between Siam and colonial France make it possible for both sides to 
claim ownership over the territory. According to the treaty language, Preah Vihear fell in 
Thai territory. However, according to semi-official maps produced by French surveyors, 
the temple was in Cambodian territory. The original dispute was thus directly attributable 
to conflicting, though plausible claims on both sides.  
The dispute did not arise until certain external circumstances changed. Though 
ownership of the temple was in dispute between the Thai government and the colonial 
French authorities as early as 1949, there was no real controversy until Cambodia 
achieved independence from France in 1954. Until then, French leaders were busy 
fighting to maintain control of Vietnam, and in that context, the Preah Vihear temple was 
not important enough to cause a serious issue. When Cambodia achieved independence 
from France, however, that changed. The Cambodian leader, Norodom Sihanouk, chose 
to press the issue of Preah Vihear. At the same time, the Thai and Cambodian 
governments responded differently to the emerging threat posed by the rise of 
communism in the region. After World War II, the Thai government became an ally of 
the U.S., and as the communist movements in Asia gained momentum, Thailand became 
staunchly anti-communist. The Cambodian government, on the other hand, decided that 
its best course was to remain neutral, and it sought to maintain relationships with all 
sides, including the communist powers. This pulled the two countries apart. Combined 
with the conflicting historical claims, the different strategic alignment of the two 
countries drove them into a dispute over Preah Vihear. Specifically, Cambodia’s rejection 
of SEATO membership led to a military buildup on the Thai side of the border and to 
Thailand’s ostensible official claim on Preah Vihear. Additionally, Cambodia’s 
relationship with the PRC helped derail bilateral negotiations over Preah Vihear.  
While the external environment, combined with conflicting historical claims, 
drove the two countries into a dispute at Preah Vihear, it also played a part in the creation 
of a possible a resolution. After the Cambodian government successfully 
internationalized the dispute against the wishes of the Thai government, the ICJ found in 
favor of Cambodia in 1962. However, the decision provoked outrage at all levels in 
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Thailand. But due to the changing strategic environment, the Thai government could not 
ignore the decision, even though it wanted to. Thailand was dependent on its anti-
communist allies, led by the United States. The United States was intent on keeping 
Cambodia away from the communist powers, and thus, did not offer any support to the 
government of Thailand vis-à-vis the Preah Vihear issue. The Thai government very 
reluctantly complied with the Preah Vihear decision, but it did not do so in good faith. 
This is clear from the Thai government’s various actions following the decision. Those 
actions included the removal of the entire flagpole at Preah Vihear, with the Thai flag still 
flying, (as opposed to lowering the flag), the closure of access to the temple, and the 
statements made by various Thai leaders. Moreover, military forces of the two countries 
clashed at Preah Vihear as late as 1966 while Thai leaders, at that time, still claimed the 
right to appeal in the future. The Thai government’s defiant behavior immediately 
following the ICJ decision, as well as the clashes between troops in the years following, 
indicate that Thailand did not accept the decision and, therefore, the issue was had not 
actually been settled.   
Analyses of the recent Preah Vihear Temple dispute often assume that the dispute 
was basically resolved with the 1962 ICJ decision, and then proceed to examine recent 
changes in both countries for reasons why a “new” conflict has occurred over the 
territory. But a closer look at the historical record demonstrates that the dispute has not 
actually been resolved. The issue appeared to have been resolved because it was not the 
major source of conflict between the two countries, in the way it had been in the 1960s, 
and the way it became in the late 1990s. The appearance is misleading, however. The 
larger conflicts that occurred in Indochina, and especially in Cambodia, simply displaced 
the Preah Vihear issue or led to a series of accommodations aimed at enabling Thai and 
Cambodian forces to confront more immediate threats. In short, the strategic environment 
shaped the behavior of both countries and effectively caused nonconflict over the temple 
and surrounding territory, even though the matter was not resolved. 
Changes in the Cambodian government in the 1970s led to compromise over 
Preah Vihear. With the Lon Nol coup of 1970, Cambodia moved into the anti-communist 
camp and allied with Thailand. In a bid to improve relations, the Lon Nol government 
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offered to share Preah Vihear with Thailand. At the time, both the Thai and Cambodian 
governments depended heavily on the support of the United States. The U.S. departure 
from Southeast Asia in 1973 lead to more change. Most importantly, the Lon Nol 
government fell to the Khmer Rouge in 1975, and Laos and South Vietnam were taken 
over by communist forces the same year.  This left the Thai government surrounded by 
communist countries. As it could no longer count on the United States, the Thai 
government responded by compromising with the communist powers in Asia, including 
Cambodia.  This led the Thai government to adopt a conciliatory posture with its 
Cambodian neighbor and it did not press the issue of Preah Vihear during the Khmer 
Rouge era, even when Khmer Rouge forces violated Thai territory near the temple.  
The late 1970s through the late 1980s posed additional challenges to Cambodia, 
and new threats to the Thai government. The Preah Vihear issue remained important 
throughout these years. When Vietnamese forces overthrew the Khmer Rouge 
government in 1978, the Thai government harbored resistance fighters, including the 
Khmer Rouge, in its territory along the border. The Thai government had reason to not 
press territorial claims at this time. The border area was poorly demarcated and this 
allowed the Thai government to deny that it was actually harboring resistance fighters 
(Khmer Rouge and others) in its territory. During the 1980s, Cambodia was torn between 
the government in Phnom Penh and its Vietnamese patron on one hand, and the 
resistance fighters supported by Thailand, the United States and China on the other hand. 
During this time, the Vietnamese threat in Cambodia was a singular issue for the Thai 
government. At the same time, the Preah Vihear issue was still important to both 
countries. The government of Cambodia still had legal possession of the temple but was 
not able to exercise effective control over much of its territory along the Thai border. 
Some in Thailand pushed for the renegotiation of the temple, while the government in 
Cambodia used the issue for propaganda purposes. At this point, the temple was in 
somewhat of a “no man’s land.”  Cambodia could not really access it as resistance 
fighters controlled the area, and Thailand could not openly contest it as Cambodia had the 
backing of the SRV. The temple was a common propaganda topic as the Cambodian 
press accused the Thais of flying reconnaissance flights over Preah Vihear, violating 
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Cambodia’s sovereignty. As the outside powers began to withdraw from Cambodia in the 
late 1980s, the two countries briefly cooperated on the Preah Vihear issue. When the 
SRV pulled its forces out of Cambodia, that threat no longer animated Thai foreign 
policy. However, further strife in Cambodia rendered the Cambodian government still 
unable to exercise effective control over its territory, including Preah Vihear. From 1993 
to 1998, the Khmer Rouge insurgents occupied the temple. During this period, the Khmer 
Rouge was able to leverage its control over territory containing natural resources, as well 
as their contacts on the Thai side of the border, to fund their continued resistance. It was 
not until the Khmer Rouge surrendered in late 1998 that the Cambodian government was 
able to control all of its territory, including Preah Vihear. This is when the dispute 
became possible once again, and it emerged shortly thereafter.  
The latest episode of the Preah Vihear Temple dispute is primarily a result of the 
same conflicting historical claims between Thailand and Cambodia that caused the 
original dispute. It remerged several years before the domestic political turmoil in 
Thailand began in 2006. It began once Cambodia finally became able to press its claims, 
and there were no longer greater threats to dissuade the two countries from disputing the 
temple area. However, domestic politics in Thailand were responsible, in large part, for 
the escalation of the dispute in 2008. Prior to the domestic political turmoil in Thailand, 
the two countries were able to manage the already sensitive issue of border demarcation 
and the Preah Vihear Temple issue. The otherwise good relations between the two 
countries prevented the Preah Vihear issue and other border disputes from escalating. 
However, the emergence of sustained political turmoil in Thailand changed this situation 
because the temple issue became a political wedge between the nationalist/royalist PAD 
and the opposition Democrat party.  
What are the causes of the Preah Vihear Temple dispute?   The most important 
cause of the dispute is that of conflicting historical claims. This is the basis of the dispute. 
The original dispute was shaped by the strategic environment, as was the seeming 
resolution. However, the dispute only appeared to be resolved because of greater threats 
to each country. After outside powers departed Cambodia, and the Cambodian 
government achieved the capability to press claims to its territory, the dispute reemerged. 
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This was several years prior to the domestic turmoil in Thailand, though that turmoil in 
did play an important role in the escalation of the dispute. This means that fixing 
Thailand’s domestic problems, however unlikely, will not necessarily resolve the dispute. 
It is likely that the current improvement in relations between the two countries over Preah 
Vihear and border demarcation is only temporary. The next test will occur when the ICJ 
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